Will Armenia give the corridor to Russia as well?

The November 9, 2020 statement contains a fourth paragraph that reads: “The peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation shall stay for a period of 5 years, with further automatic 5-year extensions, where 6 months prior to the expiry of the time period none of the Parties declares of its intention to terminate the application of the provision.”
However, neither Yerevan nor Baku has requested Moscow to terminate the agreement six months before the expiration date, and in fact, they have not withdrawn their signatures.

Between 2020 and 2022, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia held a series of negotiations on various topics, from the demarcation and delimitation of the state border to the unblocking of regional communications. Neither Yerevan nor Baku has announced that all the agreements reached during this period have been nullified.

The 2020 statement also contains a ninth paragraph, which states:
“The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the safety of transport communication between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with a view to organize the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions. Control over transport communication shall be exercised by the Border Guard Service bodies of the FSS of Russia.”

Today, we have a joint Washington statement by the United States, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Its third and fourth paragraphs state: “These efforts are to include unimpeded connectivity between the main part of the Republic of Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through the territory of the Republic of Armenia with reciprocal benefits for international and intra-state connectivity for the Republic of Armenia.” (…) “The Republic of Armenia will work with the United States of America and mutually determined third parties, to set forth a framework for the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’ (TRIPP) connectivity project in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.”

The ninth paragraph of the 2020 statement (and the entire logic of the 2020 statement) is in direct contradiction with the Washington document. How will this international legal case be resolved? Will it become a casus belli for a new war—this time a regional one—as the Washington processes may affect not only the architecture of the South Caucasus but also the status of the entire Caspian Sea?

Following the signing of the document, the harshest reactions came from representatives of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the office of the Spiritual leader of Iran. Particularly striking was the assessment by General Yadollah Javani, deputy head of the IRGC for political affairs, who stated: “Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan made the same mistake as Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky by trusting the United States.”

But what mistake did Zelensky make? Like the previous leaders of Ukraine, he attempted to build a security architecture that did not take into account Russia’s interests, relying on the support of external forces.

This is exactly what Pashinyan and Aliyev are doing. They are not taking into account Armenia’s interests and they are not considering the interests of Iran and Russia. How will these issues be resolved, and how will Armenia’s security and sovereignty be preserved? Does the government have answers to these questions?

Think about it…