Pashinyan secured himself ahead of visit to Russia

Last week, the Speaker of Armenia’s National Assembly, Alen Simonyan, confirmed that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will soon visit Russia. Every visit Pashinyan makes to Russia is a stress test—not only for his relations with the West, but especially for his ties with Turkey. Before and after each visit, anti-Russian rhetoric is guaranteed. In Pashinyan’s view, this reassures Ankara that he remains committed to his geopolitical venture: integrating Armenia into the Turkic world.

This time is no exception. Ahead of the visit, Armenian-Russian relations were publicly criticized by both the head of the Civil Contract party and President Vahagn Khachaturyan.

Let’s begin with Khachaturyan, who stated in an interview with RTVI that Armenia has transformed from Russia’s “younger brother” into a full-fledged partner. “Our relationship with Russia is now entirely different—it’s a partnership. This is what we’ve been striving for over the past four years,” Khachaturyan said.

A simple analysis of the past four years reveals what has changed to make Khachaturyan claim that “Armenia is no longer Russia’s younger brother.” During this period, the Armenian people endured significant losses—from the surrender of Artsakh to Azerbaijan, the ceding of territories in the Tavush region to commitments to constitutional changes and granting a corridor through Syunik to Azerbaijan and Turkey. It turns out when Armenia was supposedly Russia’s “younger brother,” it had everything—from control over Karabakh to secure borders in Tavush and Syunik. Now, it has none of that. Armenia is becoming part of the Turkic world, yet in Pashinyan and Khachaturyan’s view, this represents sovereignty.

In reality, Armenia was never Russia’s “younger brother.” For years, a legal framework enabled Armenia to be a strategic ally of Russia. If Armenia had truly lacked sovereignty, how did Pashinyan come to power in 2018? Do Khachaturyan and Pashinyan not see the contradiction? The truth is, the concept of Armenia as a strategic partner to Russia doesn’t align with Pashinyan’s plans—because in such a scenario, he and his team would be sidelined.

As for Pashinyan himself, this time he explained why Yerevan’s stance toward the CSTO has shifted. Pashinyan once again criticized the CSTO, stating that Armenia has reconsidered its relationship with the organization due to unresolved issues in ensuring external security. “It turns out the organization considers Azerbaijan just as much a brotherly nation as Armenia,” Pashinyan said.

The political subtext of Pashinyan’s statement is clear: he was forced to recognize Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan because “the CSTO sees Azerbaijan as a fraternal state.” These are Pashinyan’s “new talking points,” though previously he blamed a wide range of actors and legal documents for the surrender of Artsakh—from the Karabakh Armenians themselves to the Alma-Ata Declaration, the 1996 OSCE summit in Lisbon, and even the Soviet KGB. This reflects an ongoing effort to shift responsibility away from himself.

Here’s the irony: before 2018, the CSTO consistently responded to regional escalations. Moreover, longtime CSTO Secretary Nikolay Bordyuzha repeatedly warned that any escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh could “ignite the entire Caucasus.” Everything changed once Pashinyan came to power.

In truth, all these statements made just before Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow serve one purpose: to shield him politically. They are meant to ensure that Turkey and Azerbaijan do not even consider the possibility that Pashinyan might reorient Armenia’s foreign policy. They are a signal to Ankara that the process of integrating Armenia into the Turkic world will continue. This is Pashinyan’s version of sovereignty.

Think about it…