A tactical dispute between Erdogan and Aliyev over Armenia’s future

Is there a topic on which Turkey and Azerbaijan lack unity? Yes—there is. It concerns the future of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the strategy for “dismantling Armenian statehood.” Let’s break it down.

Recently, Ruben Rubinyan, Deputy Speaker of Armenia’s National Assembly, stated on Public Television that Yerevan hopes to sign a “peace agreement” with Baku in September. “I hope that Armenia and Azerbaijan will sign a ‘peace treaty’ not in the first half of 2026, but in late 2025 or in September 2025,” Rubinyan said.

But why did Rubinyan suddenly mention September 2025 and the first half of 2026? Rubinyan was echoing Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who recently stated that Armenia and Azerbaijan would sign a “peace treaty” in the first half of 2026. According to Fidan, once the final agreement between Yerevan and Baku is signed, Turkey will “quickly normalize relations with Armenia.”

Fidan’s statement contradicts the official position of Baku, which insists that the “peace treaty” can only be signed after Armenia amends its Constitution. Moreover, if Baku does not abandon its precondition, it is technically impossible for Pashinyan to hold a constitutional referendum before June 2026 (the deadline is approaching) and then participate in the National Assembly elections. And here we are talking about the technical aspect of the issue, but there is also a political component: if a referendum is held before the elections and it is lost, then a public backlash could lead to a crushing defeat in the parliamentary elections. This is something that Turkey cannot ignore, but why did Fidan make such a statement?

Because Ankara sees that even the so-called “initialed peace treaty” with Azerbaijan has not greatly strengthened Pashinyan’s position in Armenian society. According to opinion polls conducted after August 8, his approval ratings remain within the margin of statistical error (3–4%).

This is why Ankara wants Aliyev to show more flexibility regarding Pashinyan. Turkey hopes that by taking Armenia under its influence, it will significantly reduce Yerevan’s dependence on Moscow, which will be impossible without progress in the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. It is vital for Ankara that Pashinyan be re-elected in 2026.

Once again, we are witnessing that Turkey and Azerbaijan have different positions on certain issues. They still dispute who played the greater role in the occupation of Artsakh. There is also no consensus on Pashinyan’s future.

Turkey is not concerned about the real peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and it does not want to sign the treaty in the first half of 2026 for this reason. Turkey needs Pashinyan to bring the destruction of the Armenian security system to its logical conclusion with his own hands: withdrawing from the CSTO, removing the 102nd Russian base, expelling Russian border guards, and unilaterally terminating the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with Russia. To do this, Pashinyan needs a new five-year term from 2026 to 2031.

Aliyev, by contrast, seems to believe in the power of paper, and as he stated in an interview after the August 8 document was signed, the new Armenian leadership would not risk damaging relations with Washington and would therefore be compelled to implement the agreements reached in the presence of President Donald Trump. In Turkey, however, there is more skepticism about the documents.

Turkey and Azerbaijan agree that Armenian statehood should be dismantled, but they differ in their tactical approaches: Ankara believes that this can only be done by Pashinyan, whereas Azerbaijan believes that it has already put Armenia in a position where any leadership will be forced to follow Pashinyan’s path.

The Armenian people have a great opportunity to prove Aliyev wrong and preserve their statehood while engaging in constructive negotiations with Baku and Ankara. The choice is up to each Armenian citizen, and it will be made in June 2026.

Think about it…