Mirzoyan’s bluff about the EU and the truth about the sabotage of the November 9 statement

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan gave an interview to DW, in which he addressed a range of issues concerning Armenia’s foreign policy and its relations with the EU, Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan. Among the topics he touched on, his remarks about Armenia’s potential application for EU membership and Azerbaijan’s stance on Point 9 of the November 9, 2020 statement—regarding the unblocking of regional communications—sparked particular resonance among Armenian experts.

Commenting on the failure to implement the November 9 agreements, Mirzoyan stated that the Armenian side had the impression that Azerbaijan was trying to give the territory in Syunik the characteristics of an extraterritorial corridor. “For example, they demanded that armed forces of a third country be stationed along this railway. I remember them saying that Russian troops should be deployed along the railway. This, of course, was unacceptable to us. There is no corridor—only the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,’” he said.

It has often been pointed out that since November 10, 2020, one of Baku’s main regional policy goals has been to dismantle the trilateral document. In the media space, Baku escalated tensions by demanding that Yerevan provide a corridor operating under the same principles as the Lachin Corridor. Armenia (as many will realize by August 2025) was not opposed to providing a corridor but objected to Russian involvement in securing the communications, and therefore sabotaged the implementation of the agreements. Armenia’s refusal eliminated the key mechanism for preserving Artsakh. Baku needed the breakdown of the agreements to justify not fulfilling the first eight points of the November 9 statement, which allowed Artsakh to survive. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan did not abandon its demand for an extraterritorial corridor.

Moreover, Point 9 of the November 9, 2020 statement was more advantageous than the Washington agreements or the “Trump Route,” at least because it called for the unblocking of all regional communications without designating a specific route. It used the term “unimpeded movement” (a regime) rather than “unimpeded road” (special control). Losing this wording deprived Armenia of leverage and isolated the transit issue.

Regarding the EU membership application, Mirzoyan stated that Armenia could submit its application as early as next month—or possibly next year.

Russia has repeatedly stated that simultaneous membership in the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is technically impossible, pointing out that Armenian legislation has already begun to diverge from EAEU norms due to efforts to align with European standards. Now, Armenia is officially declaring its intention to join the EU.

Much suggests that Prime Minister Pashinyan is not merely seeking sanctions from the EAEU for violating integration norms, but is aiming to provoke Armenia’s expulsion from the Union—so he can later claim, as with the CSTO, that “we didn’t leave the EAEU, the EAEU left Armenia.” The country is being led toward a situation where economic ties with the EAEU and Russia will be severed, no alternatives to the Turkish market and goods will remain, and the result of “European integration” will be absorption into the Turkic world. Yet neither Pashinyan nor Mirzoyan has dared to say this outright.

Think about it…