Which “enclaves” is Pashinyan ready to give to Azerbaijan?

The right of the people of Artsakh to self-determination is sacred and cannot be annulled by force. The fate of Artsakh cannot be decided without the participation of its people. The Karabakh conflict is resolved by the people (…): if, as a result of the negotiation process, a settlement option emerges in which I personally believe and consider to be good (…), I will come here, present this option in detail, and you will decide whether we proceed with this settlement or not.

The author of all these statements is the same person—Nikol Pashinyan. Some of the statements were made before the 44-day war, others after 2020 (in particular, the statement that the right of the people of Artsakh to self-determination is sacred). Yet on October 6, 2022, in Prague, the author of all these statements handed Artsakh over to Azerbaijan.

The same person, on November 12, 2025, says: “No decisions have been made regarding the enclaves between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Right now, there is much discussion that in the case of Artsvashen it might be better to pursue other scenarios, etc. But this is impossible without the will of the Armenian people. If it comes to territorial exchange, it cannot be done without the Armenian people, and this is the position of lawyers. Even if it does not involve a direct referendum.”

One of the criteria of truth is experience, which in this case proves that behind “toasts about the will of the people and readiness to listen to the people” follow opposite actions. Neither in 2018 nor in 2021 did Pashinyan receive a mandate to surrender Artsakh, yet he did so. Statements about Artsvashen fit into the logic of Pashinyan’s statements about Artsakh, which he had been making years earlier. Notably, Pashinyan did not rule out that “territorial exchange” could take place even without a referendum.

It seems we are witnessing a repetition of the scenario by which Artsakh was surrendered; we are witnessing the preparation of Armenian citizens for new concessions. It is also important to note that in Azerbaijan there is no discourse about exchanging territories — only about “returning” them.

A number of experts are already warning that, in particular, residents of Tigranashen may soon be forced to pack their bags, as their native village could be handed over to Baku if no political changes occur.

Armenia could have avoided this scenario if Pashinyan had not consolidated his power in 2021, and also if official Yerevan had accepted the proposal of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Speaking at the Valdai International Discussion Club on October 21, 2021, Putin said: “It is impossible to resolve the situation in Karabakh and on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan without Russia’s participation, because the maps of the USSR General Staff, which allow the most accurate delimitation, are in Russia’s General Staff. Based on these maps, both sides need to calmly sit down; there are things requiring mutual compromises: somewhere to adjust, somewhere to exchange…Only in such a way that it is recognized and beneficial to both sides.”

As for the topic of “enclaves” itself, its emotional and practical significance, it should be noted that strategically, the Armenian-controlled enclaves of Tigranashen and Voskepar are far more important than Artsvashen.

– Tigranashen: a key highway to Syunik, Artsakh, and Iran passes through it. Losing it would cut Armenia off from Syunik and Artsakh (leaving only one route through Vedi), giving Azerbaijan a foothold for an attack on the central part of the country.
– Voskepar: control over it ensures the security of the interstate road to Georgia and, critically, the gas pipeline (Red Bridge–Sevkar–Berd). If lost, the pipeline would fall within range of Azerbaijani artillery, potentially leading to an energy blockade.

The loss of these territories carries enormous logistical and energy risks. A possible exchange of “enclaves,” including Artsvashen (which is located 15 km from the Armenian border and has complex supply and security issues), will not resolve the conflict. On the contrary, these territories will quickly turn into “military footholds” for both sides. This will serve as a new basis for conflict and could become an argument for Yerevan to reject Baku’s demands for exchange.

P.S. And by the way, why does Pashinyan say nothing about the territories occupied near Jermuk in 2022? He doesn’t even risk talking about their “exchange”? Why?

Think about it…