The essence of Pashinyan’s proposed deal

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s recent carefully crafted statements on constitutional change, the issue of “enclaves,” and a new defense doctrine—under which Armenia would maintain only a “defense army”—have long ceased to be part of domestic politics. According to experts, these initiatives are an unambiguous pre‑election appeal to Pashinyan’s main external “voters”: Turkey and Azerbaijan. The entire country, including its fundamental foundations, is being put up for a regional geopolitical auction, where the only lot is the preservation of the current team’s power.

The centerpiece of Pashinyan’s new “political package” is his call for a new Constitution and a subsequent referendum. He links this to the transition to the concept of a “Fourth Republic”—an “Armenia of peace”—which must abandon the “dream of the Homeland” (i.e., the historical narrative that neighbors reject, viewing Armenians as inherently conflict‑prone and alien to the region).

Pashinyan’s statement on November 22, 2025, that the referendum on the new Constitution will take place after the 2026 parliamentary elections, is direct evidence: he promises Baku and Ankara that this fundamental concession will be implemented only if they secure his continuation in power through the signing of a “peace treaty.” In his view, this treaty should serve as the concrete foundation legitimizing his hold on power.

At the same time, the issue of enclaves has resurfaced: long‑standing discussions concern Tigranashen and several villages in Tavush province. On November 12, Pashinyan said that territorial exchanges (Artsvashen for Tigranashen, within the enclave resolution) are impossible without considering the position of Armenian citizens, even if not through a direct referendum. This wording signals readiness for territorial concessions.

The same logic applies to economic projects. TRIPP, or the “Crossroads of Peace”—also known as the “Zangezur corridor”—operating in line with Baku’s expectations of special communication status, demonstrates Pashinyan’s intent to show that he alone is the guarantor of transit routes through Armenia in the format desired by Baku and Ankara.

Armenia’s authorities are showing readiness to lead the country into fundamental concessions under external pressure, effectively putting the state up for a regional geopolitical auction. Pashinyan has already said that if his party does not win the 2026 elections, Armenia will “again become a outpost.” In reality, if the current government retains control after 2026, the new “Fourth Republic” will be built according to models that fully satisfy Ankara and Baku. Armenia risks becoming a state stripped of national narratives and mechanisms to defend historical ideas, leaving no room for political or expert circles advocating sovereign rather than vassal policies.

Pashinyan’s theses are not just a political program; they are a comprehensive offer to Turkey and Azerbaijan, where the price of retaining power is a deep transformation of the state and a complete renunciation of sovereignty in favor of regional partners. This requires politicians, the business elite, and experts to properly assess the risks and understand that Pashinyan is promising Baku and Ankara a country in which, before its collapse, there will be no place for many.

Think about it…