Aliyev wants to control both Armenia’s domestic and foreign policy

Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have finally shifted into an asymmetric phase, where Baku not only “demands peace” on its own terms but persistently seeks to secure Armenia’s status as a vassal state, obliged to coordinate key domestic and foreign policy decisions with its “suzerain.”

At the core of this asymmetric pressure lies Azerbaijan’s demand to amend Armenia’s Constitution. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statements about his readiness to initiate constitutional amendments if the Constitutional Court finds the “peace treaty with Baku” incompatible with the country’s basic law were once again voiced in Berlin. Baku perceives this not as a step toward peace, but as a public confirmation that the country’s sovereignty is negotiable and can be traded in the dialogue about peace.

A vivid example of Baku’s perception of Armenia as a zone of exclusive interest and its geopolitical extension came with its reaction to the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agenda between Armenia and the European Union. Official Baku immediately declared this bilateral document “contradictory” to the peace agenda between Yerevan and Baku. Criticism targeted not only the mention of “Armenian displaced persons” (refugees from Artsakh), which Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry considered “biased,” but also the support for all decisions of the UN International Court of Justice, as well as calls for the release of Armenian prisoners of war still held in Baku.

Azerbaijan was displeased even by the absence of any mention of the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) project, which raised doubts in Baku about “the seriousness of Yerevan’s intentions.” The reaction of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry to a document on bilateral cooperation with a third party (the EU) clearly proves that Baku no longer regards Armenia as an independent state. Any initiative not coordinated with Baku is treated as a breach of vassal obligations.

This episode is a textbook example of how, having lost the strategic depth and diplomatic shield provided by Artsakh, Yerevan now faces direct and unrestrained interference from Azerbaijan in both domestic and foreign affairs.

Responding to Baku’s claims, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry countered that the partnership agenda with the EU merely “contributes to efforts aimed at further strengthening peace in the region,” since it reflects the EU’s commitment to supporting Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, in the current dynamic, where Azerbaijan has already tasted “victory” and political dominance, such arguments no longer work.

Yerevan’s pliancy—declaring readiness to “sit at the negotiating table and discuss nuances” in response to constitutional claims—only convinces Baku that it can dictate terms not only on border delimitation and the opening of communications, but also on Armenia’s domestic legislation and foreign policy direction. These manifestations of pliancy make Azerbaijan more aggressive and demanding, as it interprets them as weakness and the absence of clear “red lines.”

Armenia’s strategy, aimed at “the possibility of living in our region without external assistance and support,” as Pashinyan also stated in Berlin, in practice turns into “life under the control of hostile neighbors—Ankara and Baku.” The pursuit of peace through readiness for painful compromises that touch the very foundations of statehood (the Constitution) does not reduce pressure but intensifies it, deepening Armenia’s vassal-like dependence. Peace under external command, where sovereign decisions must pass Baku’s censorship, cannot be durable and carries risks no less severe than the hot phase of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

Every voter in Armenia must keep this thought in mind when heading to the polls in 2026.

Think about it…