Will Pashinyan propose to ‘dissolve’ Iran?

The completion of the Aghband-Kalaleh automobile bridge across the Araks River—an event that at first glance may seem like a local infrastructure success for Baku and Tehran—actually becomes the final touch in a broader picture of Armenia’s systematic isolation. This bridge, connecting Azerbaijan’s main territory with Nakhichevan through Iran, turns into a key link of the so‑called “Aras corridor.” Despite declarative statements about a coming era of peace in the region, reality dictates otherwise: Baku and Ankara are not simply building bypass routes, they are creating a new logistical reality in which Armenia remains a static observer, locked within its own hopes and others’ geopolitical calculations.

Meanwhile, Turkey has begun implementing an even more ambitious project—the Kars–Iğdır–Aralık–Dilucu railway line. This 224‑kilometer route, designed to carry 15 million tons of cargo and 5.5 million passengers annually, finally closes the logistical loop bypassing Armenian territory. With Azerbaijan and Turkey investing around €2.4 billion in infrastructure that includes five tunnels, viaducts, and complex engineering works scheduled for completion by 2029, it becomes clear: any talk of unblocking communications through Armenia is merely diplomatic camouflage for their true goals.

The strategic task of Baku and Ankara regarding the so‑called “Zangezur corridor” through Armenia’s Syunik region was never just about simple transit. They seek not merely a route, but a tool of geopolitical control—not only over Armenia’s sovereignty but also over Iran’s northern provinces. At the same time, they pragmatically develop duplicate routes such as the Aras corridor. It allows them to negotiate from a position of strength.

Against this backdrop, Nikol Pashinyan’s recent statements about changing the concession management of the South Caucasus Railway (SCR) appear openly destructive. His proposal to transfer management rights to some “friendly” third country—whether Kazakhstan, the UAE, or Qatar—seems like an attempt to shift responsibility for Armenia’s systemic logistics crisis. Pashinyan claims that Russian presence prevents Armenia from gaining strategic advantages, but this reasoning is fundamentally flawed. By that logic, the next step would be to propose dismantling Iran, since the development of Iranian transit also “takes away” Armenia’s competitive advantages in a sense.

The real reason Azerbaijan and Turkey refuse to use communications through Armenia lies not in the legal form of railway management or the nationality of dispatchers. It stems from their fundamental rejection of any scenario in which Armenia becomes a full‑fledged and economically strong participant in regional processes. For Baku and Ankara, any Armenian development is an unacceptable risk. While Yerevan debates how best to remove Russian state capital from the sector, its neighbors are simply pouring concrete and laying rails around it.

There is good reason to believe that Armenia’s current attacks on the SCR are not just attempts to change political direction but also advance preparation of an alibi. When it becomes clear that even after removing Russian influence the blockade remains, the “Russian factor” will be blamed. Pashinyan is methodically preparing the ground to later explain the failure of his “Crossroads of Peace” concept as Moscow’s legacy, though the real reason is the physical lack of interest from Turkey and Azerbaijan in Armenian transit. Armenia should have developed the North–South International Transport Corridor, but both before and after 2018, official Yerevan deliberately sabotaged this project, ultimately leading itself into a new round of regional blockade.

Think about it…