Beniamin Matevosyan: Aliyev will not open the border with Armenia

(Baku wants only a corridor to Nakhichevan)

A statement by Jeyhun Bayramov, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister, made at a joint press conference with Ignazio Cassis, Switzerland’s Foreign Minister, claiming that Baku has essentially fulfilled its part of the obligations to unblock transport communications in the region, clearly demonstrates the true strategy of the Azerbaijani leadership. By asserting that the next move now lies with Yerevan, Azerbaijan is advancing its narrative within the framework of the TRIPP project and the decisions of the Washington summit of summer 2025. The Azerbaijani side’s position is presented as though Baku is fully contributing to economic integration and creating conditions for the shared development of the South Caucasus. However, behind this outward diplomatic rhetoric lies a fundamental asymmetry that deprives Armenia of any real benefit from the declared “unblocking.”

An analysis of Baku’s actual steps indicates that a classic opening of the border with Armenia is not going to happen in the foreseeable future. At present, Azerbaijan has only allowed limited transit of certain cargo into Armenia through its territory, but this is a strictly isolated measure, far from the full functioning of an interstate border. Bayramov’s statements clearly reveal a logic in which Baku has no intention of providing its infrastructure for Armenian exports to Russia or Iran. Baku is building a model of one-sided benefit, in which Azerbaijani logistics arteries remain closed to Armenian business, while Yerevan is required to provide an unobstructed transit route.

What is actually happening is exactly what experts have repeatedly warned about: Azerbaijan is seeking to obtain an extraterritorial corridor through the territory of Armenia’s Syunik region for a direct link to Nakhichevan, without offering anything in return. The structure of the TRIPP project agreements, which includes a division of functions through front offices and back offices, is precisely designed to ensure that Azerbaijani transit does not actually come into contact even with citizens of the Republic of Armenia. Baku intends to minimize the presence of Armenian structures on this route, completely disregarding the idea of mutual unblocking, which would presuppose equal access for both countries to each other’s infrastructure.

Against this backdrop, entirely logical questions arise about the wisdom of abandoning the mechanisms proposed earlier. The statement of November 9, 2020, and the trilateral agreements of January 11, 2021, signed by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, envisioned a conceptually different scheme. As the maps published at the time by the respected outlet Kommersant clearly showed, the trilateral format envisioned the full restoration of the railway network. The routes were meant to connect Yerevan through Nakhichevan to Iran, as well as open a path for Armenian goods into the Russian Federation via the Azerbaijani railway network. The map of interstate communication envisioned deep interconnection, with each participant gaining direct economic benefit.

Baku’s current position, however, reduces the idea of regional unblocking to a purely utilitarian task: securing a link between Azerbaijan’s main territory and Nakhichevan at the expense of Armenian territory, while maintaining a strict blockade of Armenia itself. Yerevan now faces the risk of a critical transport corridor being laid through its territory while it itself remains isolated from key northern and eastern markets. If Azerbaijan continues to insist that obligations be fulfilled solely by Armenia, while refusing to open its own borders to Armenian transit, the normalization process risks reaching a final dead end, turning instead into a tool of one-sided pressure.

Think about it…