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Beniamin Matevosyan: is Putin ready to cross red lines in relations with Armenia?

August 19 2026, 21:00

(What conclusions should Armenia draw from Putin’s visit to Iturup)

The working trip by Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, to the Kuril island of Iturup on August 13, 2026, became an unprecedented event for the entire system of relations between Moscow and Tokyo. Other senior officials, including Dmitry Medvedev and Mikhail Mishustin, had previously visited the Kuril chain on multiple occasions, but the head of the Russian state himself had until now refrained from visiting this particular island. This pause, which had lasted since Putin’s very first presidential term, served as a kind of diplomatic bow toward Tokyo. Moscow was thereby signaling that it was ready to keep channels of dialogue open on sensitive issues, including discussion of joint economic activity on the islands of the South Kuril chain and the search for compromises on the economic agenda.

What are these islands, exactly? Following the outcome of World War II, the Kuril Islands became part of the Soviet Union. On September 8, 1951, a peace treaty was signed in San Francisco between Japan and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Under Article 2 (Chapter II) of the document, Japan formally renounced all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation did not sign this treaty, pointing out that the document did not clearly establish the transfer of sovereignty over these territories directly to the USSR.
In 1956, the Joint Declaration of the USSR and Japan was signed, in which the Soviet side expressed readiness to hand over the islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan after the conclusion of a full peace treaty. However, further negotiations ended up frozen, in part due to the 1960 conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan, which provided for the stationing of American military bases on Japanese territory.

The dynamic of relations between Putin’s Russia and Japan changed sharply after Tokyo consistently joined the sanctions and political coalition opposing Russia in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. In response to Japan’s actions, the Kremlin ultimately dismantled the previous format of diplomatic restraint and moved to direct, demonstrative steps. Putin’s visit to Iturup was a clear signal that Moscow no longer intends to take other countries’ “red lines” into account if a partner country takes part in initiatives that Russia classifies as hostile.

The main question this raises for the expert-analytical community in Yerevan is how applicable similar logic is to Armenia’s current foreign policy. The regional transformation shows that the Kremlin has stopped separating diplomatic courtesy from practical policy toward countries that shift their geopolitical vector. When Yerevan drifts toward the EU, which is preparing for war with Russia (at least according to Russian politicians, officials and analysts), Moscow perceives this not simply as a sovereign choice, but as a direct move into a hostile camp.

From the Iturup precedent, Armenia needs to draw a direct, practical conclusion: the concept of previously inviolable “red lines” in relations with Russia no longer works. If Yerevan continues moving down the path of integration into projects and alliances aimed at inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, the Russian side may apply mirror measures of containment and pressure.

Amid escalating tension, Moscow could move to expel or effectively exclude the Republic of Armenia from structures such as the CSTO and the EAEU. For Yerevan, such a scenario would mean the instant loss of both its institutional military shield and the preferential terms on the markets of the Commonwealth countries that form the basis of national economic stability.

The example of the Kuril Islands clearly shows that the Kremlin is ready to take steps that once seemed unthinkable, if it believes its counterpart has definitively crossed the boundaries of what is acceptable in bilateral relations.

Think about it…