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Beniamin Matevosyan: Putin has cornered Pashinyan on nuclear power plant issue

September 30 2026, 19:00

(Key takeaways from Likhachev’s visit to Armenia)

The visit of Alexey Likhachev, director general of Rosatom, to Yerevan and his talks with Nikol Pashinyan, the prime minister, marked a fundamental shift in the energy dialogue between Russia and Armenia. The Russian side de facto rejected the Armenian leadership’s proposal, previously voiced by Eduard Martirosyan, director of the Metsamor nuclear power plant, to extend the operating life of the existing plant again, first to 2036 and then to 2041. Instead, Moscow clearly and unequivocally pointed to the only sensible alternative: building a new, state-of-the-art power unit and, in the longer term, a second one.

The Armenian prime minister’s calculation in this energy scheme was perfectly clear. Yerevan expected to squeeze as much as possible out of the Soviet-era Metsamor plant, which supplies up to 40% of the country’s cheap electricity, and, closer to the deadline for its shutdown, to launch an alternative project, for example one using American small modular reactor technology. In essence, Pashinyan tried to apply to the nuclear sector the same tactic he uses toward the EAEU: to extract maximum benefit from the current format of cooperation with Moscow until a real Western-oriented replacement appears. However, the Kremlin and Rosatom saw through this plan in advance and, through Likhachev, firmly shut down the possibility of such a scenario.

The key element of the Russian initiative was the proposal to build a new VVER-1000 (ВВЭР-1000) power unit within an international consortium with foreign suppliers, including companies from EU countries and Asia (namely France, South Korea and China). This initiative should be viewed in two important contexts. First, the consortium proposal is a very concrete step toward diversifying the Armenian energy market. This is exactly the kind of diversification that the Armenian authorities call for constantly at every international venue.

Second, the contrast with other infrastructure disputes between Yerevan and Moscow is telling. In seeking to take the concession for managing Armenia’s railways away from the South Caucasus Railway ahead of schedule, Pashinyan publicly argues that the country needs to attract international investment and integrate into the global transport system. On the nuclear issue, however, Moscow immediately knocks this card out of Pashinyan’s deck. As a clear precedent, Rosatom can cite the recently approved project for Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant.

There, the Russian state corporation led an international consortium that included leading manufacturers from France, South Korea and China, ensuring a balance of interests and the highest technical standard.

Thus, Russia is depriving Pashinyan of any room for maneuver and of the chance to dodge a decision, as he usually does. If Yerevan turns down even the proposal for an international consortium, in which Rosatom is ready to work side by side with European and Asian giants, it will be final and indisputable proof that the only logic of the Armenian leadership is to act against Russia’s interests. In that case, Moscow’s response could be extremely unpleasant and unpredictable for the Armenian side.

Think about it…