Aliyev does not believe in Pashinyan’s re-election

The “honeymoon” between Yerevan and Baku—or more precisely, between Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev—has ended. This is evident from the steadily intensifying Azerbaijani rhetoric.

Chronologically, it began with a statement by Azerbaijani MP Aziz Alekberli, head of the so-called “community of Western Azerbaijan,” who declared that not 300,000 but half a million Azerbaijanis must “return to Armenia.”

Alekberli’s words were not accidental but reflected Baku’s official political line, confirmed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. On November 3, he said that “Armenians and Armenia should not fear the ‘return’ of Azerbaijanis,” and further claimed that maps from the early 20th century show no Lake Sevan, only Lake Goycha.

Following Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs joined in. Aykhan Hajizada, head of the ministry’s press service, declared that the “return” of the village of Tigranashen (Ararat Province) and three “enclaves” in Tavush remains a priority for Baku. In parallel, Azerbaijani MP Gudrat Hasanguliyev warned that if Armenia does not promptly decide to “open the corridor,” Azerbaijan will be forced to clear the corridor territory by force (referring to Armenia’s Syunik region) and then, under strict guarantees, hand it over to Russia or the United States in accordance with the agreements of November 10, 2020, or August 8, 2025.

Territorial demands on Armenia, as well as threats of force, are driven by several factors. Although Armenia and Azerbaijan approved regulations for the joint work of border delimitation commissions in late October 2024, the sides did not adopt a single, clear map as the basis for delimitation. Today, Azerbaijan interprets realities to its advantage (for example, according to Soviet maps of the 1920s, Armenia’s territory covers more than 31,000 square kilometers with no enclaves, but those maps were not used as the basis for delimitation; instead, other maps from different periods were chosen). As for the threat of force, the issue lies not only in the fact that the August 8 agreements were not worked out in detail (such as timelines for infrastructure projects), but also in the absence of international guarantors for their implementation.

The situation may also escalate for another reason—internal to Armenia. Apparently, even in Azerbaijan there is little belief in Pashinyan’s re-election in 2026. In the short period before the expected parliamentary elections, while the “Civil Contract” party and Pashinyan remain in power, official Baku will try to extract the maximum possible concessions, so that in the event of political changes in Armenia, it will retain leverage over the new Armenian government. This is the expected tactic.

The coming months will be the period when Aliyev, through Pashinyan, will attempt to establish various footholds in Armenia—from “enclaves” to the presence of Azerbaijanis in Armenia, or obligations to accept Azerbaijanis and grant them special status—to exert pressure on any future Armenian government. All of this is a direct consequence of Pashinyan’s ability to retain power in 2021, and it is a reason for the citizens of Armenia, the sole source of authority, to reflect on their electoral choices in the upcoming elections. If the Armenian people do not take steps appropriate to the situation, Aliyev will not stop.

Think about it…