Both Armenia and Russia are enemies for Turkey

Yesterday it became known that the total expenses for transportation, accommodation and meals for Turkish journalists who recently visited Armenia on a media tour amounted to over 7.5 million drams (more than 18 thousand US dollars).

Media tours are a common practice in the modern world. However, in Armenia’s case, at least two questions arise: why did Pashinyan decide to invite Turkish journalists on the eve of the announcement regarding the approval of the “peace agreement with Baku” (perhaps to give some kind of report to the Turkish side on the progress made)? And why did neither the government apparatus nor the Public Relations and Information Center coordinate the content of the reports from Armenia in advance? No one is saying that the work of journalists should be completely censored, but blatant insults against Armenia should not be allowed.

Following the media tour, CNN Turk broadcast an anti-Armenian report. In his report, the journalist says that the Persian Blue Mosque in Yerevan is Turkish and the only surviving one of the eight Turkish mosques in the city. This kind of content about Armenia was prevalent throughout the coverage.

It is worth noting that while we were focused on studying the details of the Turkish journalists’ visit and analyzing the nuances of Yerevan and Baku’s statements, Turkey’s local media proved that Armenia, as before, is perceived by Ankara as an enemy and that Russia also remains an enemy for Turkey.

This was evident from a surge of statements about Crimea. Once again, the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that “Crimea is Ukrainian,” and Ankara does not recognize its “annexation.” Turkish media outlets, ranging from Anadolu to TRT and Yeni Şafak, not only disseminated the statement from the Turkish Foreign Ministry but also filled the news feed with analyses emphasizing the importance of “returning Crimea to Ukraine’s control.” This occurred at a time when Western sources speculated that the United States might recognize Crimea as Russian during negotiations between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.

In other words, Moscow managed to reach an agreement with the Americans faster than with Turkey. But does Turkey even want to agree on something or adhere to agreements with those it considers its enemies? By the way, this applies equally to Armenia and Russia.

All other things being equal, with a different leadership in Armenia, Turkey’s anti-Russian sentiment (along with recent outbreaks of deep-seated Russophobia in Azerbaijan) could be a historic opportunity for Armenia. For many years, it was Armenia’s alliance and military-political cooperation with Russia that helped Yerevan hold Turkey—and by extension, Azerbaijan—in check.

If today, taking into account geopolitical trends, the Yerevan-Moscow partnership were to be restored, then, at a minimum, the implementation of the November 9, 2020 document might become realistic. This, among other things, could mean the return of 120,000 Armenians to Artsakh, as well as substantive negotiations on the real unblocking of communications in the region—rather than surrendering everything to Azerbaijan in a display of weakness in hopes of integrating Armenia into the Turkic world. After all, the Turkic world appears to be the only realm where Pashinyan has any chance of maintaining his power and personal security.

Think about it…