Erdogan’s propagandist threatens Armenia
November 06 2025, 20:30
After Azerbaijan’s president said that “Sevan does not exist on maps, only Lake Goycha”, and that “Armenians should not fear the return of Azerbaijanis,” it was logical to expect an official reaction from Yerevan. The reaction came, and it was no surprise—Nikol Pashinyan and Ararat Mirzoyan have been speaking for two days at an international conference in Yerevan. However, their response shows no alternative strategy to Baku’s statements other than “non-resistance to evil by violence,” which, in the regional context, effectively means yielding to Azerbaijani demands.
Pashinyan, commenting on relations with Azerbaijan the day before, chose to analyze their socio-psychological aspect. Meanwhile, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said that dialogue and relations between Armenia and Turkey are, in a sense, a mirror reflection of the situation with Azerbaijan—thus giving a positive tone to relations with Turkey in contrast to Baku’s aggressive rhetoric. But is this really the case? Is Turkey’s rhetoric less aggressive?
To answer this, one should pay closer attention to Turkish domestic political actors—especially those who, despite being only members of the Turkish parliament, receive attention not only from state-controlled Turkish media but also official receptions with Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov.
One such figure is Mustafa Destici, chairman of the Turkish Great Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi) and a member of parliament. What does Destici say about Armenians and Armenia? The Turkish MP notes that the “Zangezur corridor” is as important for Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Armenia as it is for the United States, China, and Russia. Armenia, having signed the agreement (the August 8 declaration), must fulfill it; otherwise, Turkey and Azerbaijan now have the strength to find other solutions if Armenia resists.
The Turkish nationalist also emphasizes that both states uphold the provisions of the “Shushi Declaration” at the highest level, that Azerbaijan is Turkey’s “red line” in relations with Armenia, and that Armenia must first reach an agreement with Azerbaijan before turning to Turkey. In other words—Yerevan must meet all of Azerbaijan’s demands, and only then can it hope for normalization of relations with Ankara.
This directly contradicts the “peace” narratives that Pashinyan and Mirzoyan have been promoting for two days, and it proves that relations with Turkey are conditioned by the state of relations with Baku—more precisely, by Aliyev’s satisfaction with relations with Yerevan.
Turkey and Azerbaijan, when looking toward Armenia, do not see Sevan, they do not see the “Fourth Republic,” they see “Western Azerbaijan.” Yet in negotiations with Armenia, Aliyev and Erdogan employ the old “good cop, bad cop” tactic: Aliyev makes harsh statements, while Erdogan appears as a “dove of peace” in comparison. Meanwhile, figures like Mustafa Destici reveal the deeper sentiments of the Turkish military-political elite toward Armenia and Armenians.
Think about it…