Iran and Russia are against TRIPP in its current form

The political dynamics in the South Caucasus are undergoing a period of sharp transformation, driven by the confrontation of regional powers and the active involvement of external players. The project of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” which envisions direct transport links between the western regions of Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan through Armenia’s southern territory (Syunik province), has become one of the key destabilizing elements in the region. An analysis of recent statements from Moscow and Tehran regarding this initiative—now referred to as the “Trump Route” or TRIPP—demonstrates the complex balance of national interests and geopolitical ambitions.

Iran has adopted the most categorical and uncompromising stance against any initiatives aimed at altering recognized state borders in the region. In this context, Tehran views the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” as a direct threat to its national interests. Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, made it clear that Tehran opposed the corridor project from the outset, citing two key factors: first, for Iran, the inviolability of regional borders is a fundamental principle of security, which would be undermined by the establishment of an extraterritorial or externally controlled transport route. Second, and of strategic importance, Iran sees this project as a potential foothold for expanding NATO or allied presence directly adjacent to its northern border. Such military-economic involvement, according to Iranian leadership, creates unacceptable risks for Iran’s northern provinces and could be synchronized with risks along Russia’s southern frontier.

Velayati stressed that the United States has a record of using economic projects in sensitive regions as a springboard for subsequent military-political and forceful presence. Thus, any American infrastructure presence in Syunik is perceived as a potential, albeit indirect, challenge to Iran’s security.

It is noteworthy that Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan, spoke back in October about Iran’s potential concerns regarding NATO representatives appearing near its borders from the Armenian side. He emphasized that currently the closest American military base to Iran is in Incirlik, Turkey, raising the question of what is more dangerous for Tehran: the presence of Azerbaijan or the United States. Kocharyan stressed that the only advantageous option for Armenia is to ensure full connectivity with Iran through the Yeraskh–Julfa railway hub, and then via Azerbaijan’s territory toward Russia. He also proposed involving Russia and China as guarantors of the August 8 agreements, which could help ease Tehran’s concerns.

The key factors shaping Moscow’s position are closely tied to its existing infrastructure control: the Russian company “South Caucasus Railway” (a subsidiary of Russian Railways) holds the concession to manage Armenia’s railway network. A significant portion of the proposed “Trump Route” passes through zones under the jurisdiction of Russian border guards. This factor, along with Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), makes Russia’s presence and approval inevitable for the implementation and effective operation of any major transport project. Thus, while Tehran grounds its position in principles of border inviolability and sovereignty, Moscow relies on economic and legal levers, clearly signaling that the South Caucasus has been and remains within Moscow’s sphere of interest.

The convergence of Iranian and Russian interests, though based on different instruments, is directed at preventing Armenia’s complete regional isolation and blocking exclusive control of transport routes by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Both Moscow and Tehran oppose an extraterritorial, force-based version of the “Zangezur Corridor.”

Ultimately, the situation in the South Caucasus boils down to a geopolitical game, where Tehran and Moscow—despite their wariness of expanding US and NATO influence—recognize that partial Western involvement in Armenia’s infrastructure projects could serve as an indirect buffer against excessive Turkish-Azerbaijani dominance, but only if this process is strictly controlled and integrated into existing Russian and Eurasian mechanisms.

Think about it…