Pashinyan is preparing unprecedented election fraud

The arrest of Gyumri Mayor Vardan Ghukasyan should be viewed as part of a broader post-election falsification campaign orchestrated by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration, which refuses to accept the will of the people. From Vanadzor to Parakar, from Vedi to Goris, from Sisian to Gyumri—wherever the government loses, it resorts to post-election mechanisms to “edit” the results. In one case, a mayor is accused of “taking bribes”; in another, the “opposition mayor is allegedly selling city land.” In Yerevan, the authorities simply bought the necessary number of mandates from the opposition faction “Public Voice” to secure the minimum quorum they needed.

Ghukasyan’s arrest confirms the view of several experts who believe that Pashinyan can no longer maintain power through legitimate means. In other words, Pashinyan will never win another election. Therefore, Armenia is facing the most extensive pre-election and electoral fraud since the days of Levon Ter-Petrosyan. The first major “bribe” to voters has already been handed out: instead of waiting until the summer of 2026, Pashinyan decided to shorten the mandatory military service from two years to one and a half, starting in January 2026. The blow to national defense does not seem to concern him. He trusts the promises of Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who have apparently guaranteed border stability until the next elections. After that, the question of dissolving the army may arise—so why delay the bribe? Hence today’s decision.

Pashinyan has a geopolitical carte blanche from the “civilized Western world” and Turkey to carry out any form of fraud. It’s no coincidence that while red berets stormed Gyumri’s city hall, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and his Moldovan counterpart Mihai Popșoi were meeting in Luxembourg. Popșoi shared Moldova’s experience in conducting elections, including efforts to “combat hybrid threats and disinformation” and to strengthen the capacity of institutions working toward that goal.

But what exactly was Moldova’s experience? Banning individual candidates and entire political groups from participating in elections. Creating physical obstacles to prevent certain citizens from voting (bridges over the Dniester were closed, denying residents of Transnistria the opportunity to vote). Disqualifying the “Great Moldova” party without removing it from the ballot. And for all this, the Moldovan authorities had a geopolitical carte blanche.

Once again, it must be emphasized: Pashinyan has a geopolitical carte blanche for any actions during the pre-election campaign, on election day, and in the post-election period. Combating this requires a combination of tools: ensuring maximum voter turnout through an active campaign, maintaining a “heated street” presence throughout the campaign period (so intense that the situation becomes nearly revolutionary), and being ready to mobilize people to defend their votes. It also means bringing in international observers—from the CIS, SCO, Latin America, as well as the US, Western and Eastern Europe—to monitor the elections and produce reports on the voting process.

One more critical point: recent events have shown that the Turkey factor will be crucial in the upcoming election campaign. As noted, this factor has also granted Pashinyan a carte blanche for any actions. This factor must be neutralized—but that can only be done by balancing it with another geopolitical force. This is the reality that has emerged since 2023, following the loss of Artsakh and the erosion of strategic depth.

Think about it…