Pashinyan will go the whole hog. What about others?

For several days now, our Western friends have been congratulating us on a “historic event”, the agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the state border in accordance with the 1991 Alma Ata Declaration. Everyone—from NATO to the UN, from Norway to Germany, from Javier Colomina and Toivo Klaar to Charles Michel, the “godfather” of the surrender of Artsakh to Azerbaijan—is delighted with the surrender of Armenian territories to Azerbaijan, in conditions when official Baku continues to refuse to recognize Armenia’s territorial integrity. This in turn means that official Baku and its partner in the “Shushi Declaration”, official Ankara, refuse to recognize Armenia’s political subjectivity, i.e., they do not recognize Armenia as a state.

Let’s leave aside the fact that the West refuses to compromise with Russia at the expense of the territories of Ukraine (at least for now), while encourages the Armenian leadership to surrender more and more territories, and let’s focus on the dangers of this format of delimitation—without clear maps, without intermediaries, without obligations on the part of official Baku—that Nikol Pashinyan himself understands.

During the meeting of the initiative group of the Civil Contract Party of the Lori region, Nikol Pashinyan stated that they laid a very serious cornerstone for entering and developing a successful stage of ensuring the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Armenia. “If we handle this properly within one or two years, we will be able to ensure the medium- and long-term existence of Armenia,” Pashinyan said.
A logical question arises, but what if not?

Pashinyan himself knows that the current process is very likely not to end with “ensuring the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Armenia.” However, he has no other choice. Only by completing this process, which will end with the complete separation of Armenia from Russia (even considering the threats of physical destruction by Turkey and Azerbaijan) and the integration of Armenia into the system of the Turkic world can Pashinyan count on continuing his political career. And not only.

But this is Pashinyan’s choice, and what do the state administration, geopolitical neighbors, and natural allies think about it?

In April, we witnessed a curious episode that many did not pay attention to: despite statements at the highest level and the entire flow of propaganda information, the office of Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan refuted statements that there had already been an agreement between the parties to begin delimitation with the Tavush region.

This was an episodic yet significant manifestation of the sentiments and disagreements in the government system. If the office of Grigoryan, who is responsible from Armenia for the work of the border delimitation commission, says that there are no agreements on Tavush, then who is actually negotiating from Armenia when statements are made that there are actually agreements?
If the April 3 statement is a manifestation of disagreement with Pashinyan’s position, does the state administration really believe that a single statement can change something?

The question to the representatives of the state administration, to the Civil Contract faction, is becoming relevant again. Do you really want to bear equal responsibility with Nikol Pashinyan for what is happening with Armenia? In 2018, did you join him to surrender both Artsakh and Armenia to Azerbaijan, as well as to become personal enemies of Russia and Iran?

By the way, both the Armenian state administration, Pashinyan’s faction in the National Assembly, the Armenian opposition, and Russia and Iran still do not understand that Pashinyan will go the whole hog. This statement is already a political axiom.

Each of them must assess what this will cost them. Think about it…