Russia continues to help Artsakh refugees, while Aliyev refuses to visit Russia

December 2025 was marked by another clear manifestation of the crisis in relations between Moscow and Baku. Ilham Aliyev’s refusal to attend the informal CIS summit in St. Petersburg on December 22, officially explained as a “tight work schedule,” in diplomatic reality looks like a deliberate demarche. His absence underscores the depth of accumulated contradictions, which go far beyond protocol formalities and were not resolved at the meeting of the two leaders in Dushanbe.

One of the main—if not the chief—triggers of the current escalation was not Russia’s interest in joining the TRIPP project, but rather the intensification of Russian humanitarian policy in the region. The project “Russia is with you”, implemented by Rossotrudnichestvo under the leadership of Deputy Head Igor Chaika, was officially extended until the end of 2026.

What especially irritates Baku is that the aid is directed specifically to refugees from the Republic of Artsakh. The Azerbaijani side strongly opposes any activity that supports the independence of the Artsakh people. Official Baku sees this as Moscow’s attempt to “revive” the Karabakh issue. The collection of personal data of displaced persons by Russian agencies is interpreted by Azerbaijani experts as the creation of a database for “future political manipulations.”

One of the key instruments of Russia’s humanitarian presence has been the activities of the NGO Eurasia, which, together with the Russian Humanitarian Mission and with the support of Rossotrudnichestvo, has deployed a wide network of assistance throughout Armenia. This work is not one-off but deeply systemic. A telling example is the town of Hrazdan, where 350 families recently received aid.

The overall reach of the program at present is impressive—support has reached 5,730 families in various regions of the country. The distribution of food packages and essential goods is accompanied by the work of volunteer headquarters on the ground. Baku regards this as a way for Russia to entrench itself “in the social fabric of Armenia,” as well as direct proof that Moscow does not intend to exclude the “Artsakh dossier” from its agenda.

For Armenia, this round of crisis between Russia and Azerbaijan has important functional significance. While Baku spends diplomatic resources countering Russian humanitarian initiatives, its ability to exert military pressure on Yerevan is to some extent constrained by the need to take Moscow into account.

Azerbaijan clearly understands that as long as systemic aid to Artsakh refugees exists, the issue of the Republic of Artsakh cannot be considered definitively closed. Keeping the Artsakh agenda alive in international and regional discourse—even in a humanitarian dimension—remains a factor restraining Baku’s territorial ambitions and the implementation of the “Western Azerbaijan” project.

By the end of 2025, the situation looks paradoxical: while Azerbaijani authorities try to impose a mirror approach on Armenian society, demanding the “return of Azerbaijanis to Yerevan and Zangezur,” Russia, through Rossotrudnichestvo and Eurasia, is effectively blocking Baku’s attempts to erase all mention of the Republic of Artsakh. For Yerevan, the current conflict between “allies” is not just a diplomatic incident but a strategic window of opportunity—allowing the country to ensure its security by relying on the growing contradictions between its key neighbors and regional players. Yet for this, Yerevan itself needs political change…

Think about it…