The decision of the Constitutional Court is the official beginning of the statehood’s dissolution process

Almost the whole day, part of the Armenian expert community has been actively discussing the fact that the Constitutional Court of Armenia, by its decision of September 26, actually recognized the reference to the Declaration of Independence in the preamble of the Constitution as having no legal force. The Declaration, as you know, mentions the reunification of the “Armenian SSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region,” which is why Azerbaijan has been demanding from Yerevan all these months to change the basic law.

What is surprising is the tone with which this decision is discussed and the comments that “Pashinyan completely closes the page of Artsakh with this decision.” Apparently, the vast majority of political actors in Armenia did not understand that Pashinyan closed the Artsakh page on October 6, 2022, in Prague, during a four-party meeting with the participation of Emanuel Macron, Charles Michel, and Ilham Aliyev. And in general, the decision of the Constitutional Court is not about Artsakh but about Armenia. More specifically, it is the start of official procedures for dissolution of the Armenian statehood.

When discussing the Constitutional Court’s decision, it is necessary to understand not only its deep content but also the context of what is happening. The context is that the decision comes immediately after Pashinyan’s trip to the United States, where, according to Nikol Pashinyan’s coalition partners, official Yerevan intended to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan under the auspices of the United States. Moreover, recent statements by the head of the National Assembly, Alen Simonyan, indicate that Yerevan wants to receive any document that can be presented as a “peace treaty” inside the country, at least during the November COP29 summit, which will be held in the Azerbaijani capital.

Having pushed through the Constitutional Court the decision to recognize the reference to the Declaration of Independence as illegal, Nikol Pashinyan wants to demonstrate that he fulfilled one of the fundamental requirements of Baku. He actually changed the Constitution because part of its preamble is recognized as “having no legal force.” However, it is not a decision of the Constitutional Court that Baku wants. It wants a national referendum, where the national rejection of the reference to the Declaration of Independence will be consolidated.

Of course, many can say that Baku is buying time. Maybe it is, but why? Ilham Aliyev has picked up an important nuance, such as Armenia’s readiness to sign a “peace treaty” on any terms (or something that can be presented as a similar document). Now official Baku is apparently taking advantage of the situation and is simultaneously carrying out two processes. It raises demands against Armenia (recall the statement of Aliyev’s assistant, Hikmet Hajiyev, who demanded the demilitarization and the transformation of Armenia into a non-aligned country) and also bargains with international actors regarding Armenia’s other concessions that a mediator is ready to guarantee Baku. Obviously, noting that Yerevan is ready to hand over both the Constitution and the Zangezur Corridor, Aliyev today tells mediators: “I already have a corridor, but what else can you offer me? What can Armenia be persuaded to do?”

Members of Pashinyan’s team, revealing details of behind-the-scenes processes after his visit to New York, noted that Pashinyan in the United States was actually supposed to agree to the formation of a certain regional format of Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan interaction, where Recep Tayyip Erdogan was supposed to be the key actor, and Ankara, as a guarantor, was supposed to persuade Azerbaijan to the signing of peace with Yerevan. The organizer of this scheme was Joshua Huck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

However, precisely because Aliyev was not satisfied with the US proposal (and the opposition of Iran and Russia also played its role), he did not go to New York, and contrary to the idea of the State Department, he did not sign any document.

Returning to the Constitutional Court’s decision, we note that by this act the Armenian authorities have already officially lowered the bar of Armenian statehood since they carried out a political act conditioned by the demand of a third party.
Isn’t this a lowering of sovereignty? Aren’t we following the classic pattern: choosing between war and shame, you get both war and shame?

However, had we implemented the agreements reflected in the November 9, 2020 document, we could have avoided both war and shame. Then Armenia’s statehood would not have been under threat.

Think about it…