Trump will help Turkey, not Armenia: Fidan is certain
January 13 2026, 19:40
The current geopolitical configuration in the South Caucasus is taking shape as a rigid and highly pragmatic alliance between Washington and Ankara, in which Armenia is assigned not the role of an active player but rather that of a passive space for the pursuit of foreign interests. Statements by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, made in an interview with TRT Haber, leave no room for illusions: the goals of the United States and Turkey in the region today coincide almost entirely—from pushing back Russian influence to resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani issue once and for all.
This diplomatic alignment is confirmed not only by Fidan’s words: Donald Trump’s special representative, Steve Witkoff, has explicitly stated that the American side coordinates its regional security actions with both current and former heads of Turkey’s intelligence agency, MIT. Such deep integration between intelligence services and diplomatic institutions demonstrates that the “New Caucasus” strategy is being drafted in Ankara and implemented through the mediation of US Ambassador to Turkey and Syria Tom Barrack—a figure whose hands bear the blood not only of Armenians in Artsakh, but also of Syria’s Alawites, Kurds, and Druze.
To understand how Armenia was led to this point, one must recall John Bolton’s visit to Yerevan in 2018. At that time, Trump’s National Security Advisor openly urged the Armenian leadership to “abandon historical stereotypes.” Today it is more than clear that by “stereotypes,” Bolton meant not only Armenia’s strategic alliance with Russia and partnership with Iran, but also its historically and contemporarily justified distrust of Turkey.
Bolton’s statement was an ultimatum announcing the dismantling of Armenia’s former security system in exchange for an illusory peace—a peace which, as the events of 2020 and 2023 showed, turned into tragedy for the Armenian people. His call became the ideological foundation for a policy in which the interests of Azerbaijan and Turkey became priorities for the White House, while Armenia was reduced to a bargaining chip in the larger confrontation with Russia and Iran.
The synchronization of US and Turkish interests became especially evident during Trump’s “second coming” to the Oval Office. His sympathies for Ilham Aliyev and Baku’s “decisiveness” fit neatly into the framework of Turkish expansion.
According to analysis in Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan’s offensive in 2020 was not merely an act of solidarity, but a strategic calculation aimed at creating a regional economic bloc. The goal of this project is the final weakening of Moscow and Tehran’s positions in the Caucasus and the consolidation of Ankara’s trade dominance. In this scheme, Armenia is regarded only as a transit corridor, stripped of real sovereignty and the right to defend its own borders.
While Armenian society is fed tales of Western aid and the TRIPP project as a supposed guarantee of security, reality dictates otherwise. Washington exerts direct pressure on Yerevan, forcing it into peace on the terms of Baku and Ankara.
Fidan emphasizes that this process fully aligns with the American vision of the region, in which Azerbaijan is the key link. Trump does not merely “admire” Baku’s decisiveness—he supports a system in which Armenia and Armenians, in their historical sense, simply have no place. Thus, the “peace formula” promoted today by the US-Turkey-Azerbaijan triumvirate is not a peace of coexistence, but the finalization of Armenia’s marginalization in history.
In the end, “abandoning stereotypes” has led to a situation where the survival of the country depends on the will of players whose declared goals are identical to those who openly call Armenia “Western Azerbaijan.”
Think about it…