Will EU help Pashinyan falsify elections?

With Armenia’s parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026, the country’s political landscape increasingly resembles not a sovereign arena for free will, but a complex laboratory for external political technologies. Official Yerevan seems to have finally settled on a survival strategy, deciding to import the so-called “Moldovan scenario” of power struggle. At the core of this strategy is the unprecedented involvement of the EU in electoral and even constitutional processes, raising questions not only about the outcome of the vote but also about the long‑term sovereignty of the republic. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan’s letter to Brussels, requesting the deployment of a rapid response group against hybrid threats, is not merely a technical appeal for assistance but a declaration of a complete reorientation under the guise of protecting democracy.

The Moldovan experience, where a similar EU team of 20 experts worked on “identifying disinformation” on social media, is seen by Nikol Pashinyan’s team as an ideal tool for neutralizing opposition content. However, in Armenia’s realities, this mission risks turning into something much more extensive than simple internet monitoring.

Judging by diplomatic leaks, the mandate of European specialists may go far beyond elections. It involves assisting in drafting a new Armenian Constitution—a document meant to cement a break with previous integration structures and establish a new trajectory, rightly described as Russophobic and, more troubling for the domestic audience, pro-Turkish. Employing external arbiters to rewrite a nation’s Basic Law traditionally signals a shift toward external governance.

Meanwhile, a campaign to cleanse the political field is unfolding within the country. Statements by Aram Sargsyan, head of the “Republic” party and a key coalition partner of the Prime Minister, about the need to ban major figures like Samvel Karapetyan from participating in the elections, show that the authorities no longer seek to maintain the appearance of competitive struggle. The attempt to administratively remove the most resourceful opponents is an admission of the weak electoral position of the ruling “Civil Contract” party. In this situation, the authorities are playing openly: if they cannot win in a fair contest of programs, they simply strike opponents from the ballot. Armenia thus risks falling into a trap where “defending democracy” through Western methods becomes a justification for establishing authoritarian control over the political process.

For the Armenian opposition, a moment of truth is approaching. As the authorities move to block blocs and deregister parties, the only viable strategy becomes adaptability and generating street processes. Experience shows that the “list method,” when a coalition runs under the brand of one legally clean party, can be an effective response to administrative pressure. If the authorities try to block central blocs, the opposition will have to show flexibility, creating new alliances literally “on the march.” Chances to change the status quo remain, since public dissatisfaction with the current course is still high, but success will depend not on catchy slogans, but more on organizational skill and readiness for legal battles with the state apparatus.

In the final analysis, we see Armenia turning into an arena for global confrontation, where Pashinyan’s elite tries to hold onto power by trading the country’s geopolitical vector. Involving the EU as “digital police” and constitutional architect is a dangerous precedent that could transform the republic into a tool for advancing the interests of third‑party interests, depriving it of maneuverability at a critically important historical moment.

Think about it…