Why are Armenians repeating Kurds’ mistakes?

In the Middle East today, the final act of a drama is unfolding—one that should serve as a handbook for Armenia’s political leadership. The Syrian “Kurdish project,” long nurtured by Washington as “the main bastion of democracy and the fight against terrorism in the region,” is rapidly approaching its end. The reason is both banal and cynical: the tool has ceased to be effective, and it has been replaced by something stronger.

So why were the Kurds abandoned? For years, the Syrian Kurds (SDF) fulfilled two crucial tasks for the United States: they acted as “infantry” in the war against ISIS and the Assad regime, and they served as a living shield preventing Iran from establishing a land corridor to the Mediterranean. But circumstances changed. With the collapse of Assad’s regime and Iran’s retreat from active involvement in Syria, the need for a Kurdish buffer disappeared.

Onto the geopolitical stage stepped Abu Mohammed al-Julani, a terrorist who now leads Syria. Despite his past, Washington and Israel saw him as a more promising partner. Why? Because Julani controls more resources, commands a stronger army, and—most importantly—has pledged to fight the remnants of Iranian influence, Hezbollah, and Hashd al-Shaabi. In the logic of American pragmatism, Julani is the “upgraded version” of an ally: stronger, more aggressive, and willing to do the dirty work on a larger scale.

The result for the Kurds is disastrous. They have lost the oil fields of Deir ez-Zor, strategic airfields, and bridges—all seized by the new regime under the silent watch of the United States. The “guarantors” limited themselves to routine threats of sanctions, while on the ground their former allies were forced into capitulation.

The Syrian situation is a frightening reflection of the course chosen today by official Yerevan. Betting exclusively on the United States and Western formats (including TRIPP), while demonstratively severing old ties, is a repetition of the Kurdish mistake—this time on the scale of an entire state.

The Kurds believed their “democratic values” and loyalty to Washington were an insurance policy. In reality, they were nothing more than a temporary instrument. Armenia now risks falling into the same role. For the West, Armenia matters only as long as it serves to weaken Russian influence or contain Iran. Once a more profitable deal emerges—say, with the Turkey-Azerbaijan duo for a final settlement of the “Iranian question”—Armenia could just as easily be “integrated” into regional projects on the terms of the victors.

The agreement now being imposed on the Kurds—the dissolution of the SDF, the transfer of borders and resources under Damascus’s control (read: Julani)—is, in effect, the elimination of autonomy. Yerevan, relying on Western mediators in negotiations with Baku, risks facing a similar outcome: “peace” at the cost of losing real levers of control over its own security and territory.

The Kurds blew up bridges across the Euphrates in a desperate attempt to save themselves, but this only worsened the humanitarian catastrophe. Without external support, their resistance is a matter of time. Armenia, dismantling its old security architecture without firm guarantees of a new one (beyond promises of monitoring missions and “support for democracy”), places itself in a position where, at the decisive moment, it may stand alone against superior neighboring forces.

Washington has effectively approved the change of power, acknowledging that Julani “more effectively” addresses the Iranian threat. Kurdish leaders are now forced into humiliating negotiations on “integration,” which resemble an act of unconditional surrender.

Unless the situation changes dramatically in the coming days, surrender will indeed be the final outcome.

The lesson for Armenia is simple: in big geopolitics, there are no “friends in values”, only temporary alignments of interests. The Kurds were needed to dismantle the old Syria. Julani is needed to build a new anti-Iranian coalition. History shows that the United States easily replaces “democratic partners” with “useful dictators” if the latter promise better results.

Armenia should think twice before burning bridges completely, hoping that an American aircraft carrier will appear in the Caucasus mountains. It never came for the Kurds.

Think about it…