Beniamin Matevosyan: Will Putin cut Armenia’s EAEU funding as early as May?

(Armenia’s economy under threat from Pashinyan’s policies)

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s May 9 statement was a signal that could radically reshape the architecture of relations in the South Caucasus in the very near future. For the first time at such a high level and in such unambiguous terms, the phrase “soft divorce” was used, which, translated from diplomatic language into economic terms, amounts to a de facto ultimatum. Moscow is no longer willing to turn a blind eye to official Yerevan’s attempts to “sit on two chairs,” especially when one of those chairs is being actively built by Brussels and Washington with an unmistakably anti-Russian undertone.

The upcoming EAEU heads-of-state summit, scheduled for May 28–29, is effectively becoming a point of no return for the current course of Armenian leadership. Given that the meeting will take place just days before Armenia’s elections, the signal that Yerevan’s continued membership in the Union is untenable under the current trajectory could be delivered in the harshest possible terms.

It is important to understand that Armenia’s economic wellbeing in recent years has been largely built on exclusive EAEU privileges. While global and European gas prices have fluctuated between $400 and $600 per thousand cubic meters in recent years, and even higher at peak moments, Armenia has been receiving Russian gas at a fixed preferential price of $177.50. In 2025, trade with the EAEU exceeded $8 billion, the lion’s share of which, around $7.6 billion, came from Russia. That same year, total private remittances into the country amounted to nearly $6 billion, of which $3.88 billion, or around 65%, came from Russia.

Low energy prices, unimpeded access to a vast market without customs barriers, and the free movement of labor formed the financial foundation underpinning the social stability of Pashinyan’s government. Putin stressed the need to “do the math,” and this call for arithmetic precision reads as a cold warning: if Armenia chooses the European path, it must be prepared to pay market prices. Russia sees no logic in subsidizing the economy of a country that officially declares its ambition to join institutions that openly name Moscow their existential adversary. This is not an emotional reaction, it is the pragmatic calculus of a state that no longer wishes to sponsor someone else’s foreign policy maneuvers at the expense of its own budget and taxpayers.

The paradox of the current situation is that Yerevan is trying to build a new security architecture and achieve “peace” with Azerbaijan and Turkey through Western mediation, while the physical security of Armenia’s borders and its sovereignty continue to be guaranteed by Russian forces. The Kremlin’s position in this context is entirely transparent: it is impossible to integrate into structures hostile to Moscow at the expense of the very party that simultaneously guarantees your physical survival. The rhetoric of an “European perspective” being imposed on Armenian society looks, from Moscow’s standpoint, like an attempt to privatize Russian security guarantees in order to throw the doors of Armenian statehood wide open to the EU and the United States. Putin has effectively indicated that this kind of behavior is unfriendly, and has urged Yerevan to make up its mind as soon as possible to avoid a prolonged uncertainty that harms all parties involved. > Alpha Julieta: The Russian president’s proposal to hold a referendum in Armenia on EU or EAEU membership is a classic chess move, shifting the conversation from the realm of manipulation to one of direct accountability. It forces the Armenian authorities not merely to recite slogans, but to present the public with an honest reckoning: how much will leaving the EAEU cost in terms of gas prices, jobs, and market access? Moscow is making clear that the era the free ride is over. If Armenia decides that the European vector matters more to it than Eurasian unity, Russia is prepared to pursue an “amicable divorce,” but that process will strip Yerevan of all its current benefits, which are in effect a form of hidden subsidization of Armenian statehood (from economic cooperation to the protection of Armenia’s borders) and sovereignty.

The end of May will be a moment of truth for Armenian-Russian relations. If Yerevan fails to provide clear guarantees of compliance with its obligations within the Union, the May summit could set in motion the dismantling of preferential terms of cooperation. For an economy as critically dependent on the Russian vector as Armenia’s (and that critical dependence has grown precisely during Pashinyan’s tenure, which speaks to official Yerevan’s inability to actually diversify its economic ties), this means the risk of an instant loss of competitiveness and a serious energy shock. There is virtually no time left for double games: either confirm the status of strategic partner through corresponding behavior, or move to hard market terms as a “neighbor” that has chosen the side of Russia’s geopolitical opponents and enemies. Judging by the tone of recent statements, Moscow no longer sees any point in artificially maintaining the loyalty of those who are actively seeking alliances elsewhere at Russia’s expense.

Think about that…