Beniamin Matevosyan: Is Putin’s Russia an enemy of Armenia?

(Highlights from Pashinyan’s speech and the government program)

John Bolton, former US National Security Advisor, is clearly pleased with Nikol Pashinyan’s statements made today from the podium of the Armenian parliament.

Pashinyan’s speech in the National Assembly marked a conceptual rupture in Yerevan’s foreign policy doctrine, laying the groundwork for an ideological rupture in Armenian identity. In his rhetoric, the head of government is advancing the thesis that the Russian state, across various historical periods, used the Armenian people and statehood as a tool for realizing its own imperial project against Turkey, and later against Azerbaijan. According to Pashinyan’s version, it was this policy that artificially instilled in Armenians’ minds the image of Azerbaijanis and Turks as the enemy. In declaring a course toward the so-called Fourth Republic, Pashinyan proposes completely revising this concept and abandoning historical antagonism with Armenia’s closest neighbors.

In practice, however, this shift in foreign policy vector has resulted in the formation of a new enemy image. Harsh rhetoric directed at Moscow, indirect but increasingly loud accusations against Russia over the Armenian Genocide, attempts to denounce the concession of the South Caucasus Railway (SCR), as well as accusations against Russia of initiating economic sanctions and attempting to change power in Yerevan through the Armenian opposition, effectively position Russia as the main source of threats to modern Armenia. In abandoning the enemy image previously assigned to Baku and Ankara, Armenia’s current leadership is transferring that status to Russia, its citizens, and representatives of the Armenian diaspora in Russia.

This emotional and media-driven shift is also reflected in official documents. In the updated government program for 2026–2031, the positioning of Russia has undergone radical changes. Whereas in the 2021–2026 program the bilateral relationship was characterized as strategic and allied, with Moscow heading the list of partners, Russia has now dropped to eighth place, behind regional neighbors (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, Georgia) and Western centers of power (the EU, the US, France). The formula of “strategic alliance” has been replaced by the vague phrase “transformation and deepening of partnership,” signaling a de facto departure from the former security model that relied on Russian military presence.

At the same time, Yerevan is displaying clear “strategic duality.” The program entirely excludes any mention of the CSTO, confirming the freeze on participation in the organization and the development of ties with NATO, yet the Armenian side is not rushing to denounce the 1997 basic Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Russia.

Yerevan is deliberately avoiding a full legal break, hoping to preserve fundamental guarantees and economic preferences. This same approach is evident in the economic sphere: while distancing itself from joint security projects, the government explicitly declares its intention to remain in the EAEU, to benefit from the single market, preferential energy tariffs, and free transit of goods. The rejection of Russian initiatives is also clearly visible on the issue of border demarcation. The process of delimitation and the ceding of border territories, presented by the authorities as “institutionalizing peace,” amount to a direct adaptation to the preconditions set by Baku and Ankara. This course has served as an alternative to Vladimir Putin’s proposal to demarcate borders based on maps from the Russian Armed Forces General Staff.

A similar transformation is underway in the energy sector. The government program records a choice of technology for a new nuclear power unit by the end of 2027.

The signing of a “123 Agreement” with the US on civil nuclear energy cooperation and the purchase of American small modular reactors point to a course toward a complete rejection of Rosatom’s services and the closure of the Metsamor nuclear power plant. The absence of a direct indication of the supplier in the program is not uncertainty, it is a systematic step toward a final break in ties with Russia.

At the same time, a narrative is forming in the pro-government media space suggesting that key Russian assets in the republic (the 102nd military base, the FSB Border Service, the SCR, and state channel broadcasting) have turned into levers of pressure held by Yerevan itself. The authorities are signaling that, in the event of economic pressure from Moscow, Armenia may initiate the withdrawal of Russian structures, definitively dismantling the former balance of power.

Think about that….