Iran’s new leader and fate of TRIPP

Recent events unfolding near the borders of the South Caucasus have forced a reconsideration of long‑held assumptions about the resilience of state systems under overwhelming external pressure. The massive strike on Iran’s command centers on the morning of February 28, 2026, had an obvious goal: instant disorganization of power and plunging the country into chaos. Yet by March 2, reality tells a different story: Iran’s apparatus, including the regular army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, displayed unprecedented resilience. The death of Ali Khamenei did not lead to the expected paralysis of will. In the skies over Tehran that morning were not only enemy missiles and drones, but also Iranian fighter aircraft engaging in battle. This fact undermines any attempts to implement scenarios of rapid regime collapse from within. Washington failed to impose either the Venezuelan option or to repeat the situation of the 12-day war of 2025, when in the first 12 hours it seemed that governance in the country was completely absent.

Institutional continuity worked flawlessly, preventing a power vacuum. A process that can be described as a “blood renewal” in the upper echelons occurred in compressed time, and today the country is de facto led by Ali Larijani. He supports continuing Khamenei’s fundamental course, which means maintaining a hard line in regional affairs. For Armenia, this internal transition of its neighbor is critically important. At present, it is clear that Iran has not only preserved its positions but has also hardened its stance toward the presence of extra-regional forces near its borders. Any activity by American specialists on the Armenian-Iranian border may now be perceived by Tehran even more sharply as a direct existential threat. If previously the language of diplomatic warnings was used, under conditions of direct conflict the rhetoric may shift to mobilization readiness for forceful response.

Tehran is clearly demonstrating its willingness to attack US facilities on the territory of third countries. In this context, the TRIPP project—if already operational—would likely become a priority target for Iran’s missile forces. Any transit corridor that Tehran views as a tool of strengthening Western influence, in conditions of full-scale confrontation, turns into a zone of combat contact. This is precisely why any “extraterritorial” logic in Armenia must be excluded, in order to maintain control over cargo passing through Armenian territory. In this regard, the idea of front- and back-offices at the border has finally discredited itself.

The war itself today dictates the urgent need for Yerevan to adopt active crisis planning. The likelihood that clashes will become protracted requires Armenian leadership to develop detailed scenarios for responding to large-scale humanitarian challenges. The arrival in Armenia of thousands of refugees from Iran is not merely a logistical issue but a systemic challenge to national viability. Authorities must prepare infrastructure (or follow Turkey’s path and de facto close the border to Iranian citizens, as today’s official Yerevan often “borrows” from Ankara), understanding that this is not only a matter of humanitarian duty but also of supporting a natural ally whose stability is directly tied to the survival of Armenian statehood within its current borders.

Think about it…