Beniamin Matevosyan: is Aliyev already blocking TRIPP?

(How should Jeyhun Bayramov’s statements be understood?)

While Armenia’s Constitutional Court rules that the TRIPP project agreement complies with the country’s Basic Law, and official Yerevan seeks to present this as a step toward strengthening sovereignty and unblocking communications, statements from Azerbaijan effectively cross out these hopes. The remarks made by Jeyhun Bayramov, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister, at a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, the day before the Constitutional Court’s ruling, clearly demonstrate that Baku is not merely reserving the final word for itself, but is de facto asserting full control over the very viability of this route.

From the standpoint of formal logic, geography, and international law, Bayramov’s assertion that “the entry and exit points of TRIPP are located on Azerbaijani territory” carries a direct ultimatum. His words lead to an entirely unambiguous conclusion: without the direct consent and approval of official Baku, not a single shipment, vehicle, or passenger will be able to physically access this 42-kilometer stretch running through Armenian territory.

By pointing to the through-route nature of the corridor and its logistical dependence on Azerbaijani and Turkish infrastructure, Baku is making it clear to Washington and Yerevan that any attempt to turn TRIPP into an independent hub for third countries, without taking Azerbaijani interests into account, is doomed to fail. Any international company planning to transport cargo along this railway will inevitably have to obtain customs permits and pass through control procedures on the Azerbaijani side.

In effect, Baku is trying to turn TRIPP into a route serving its own needs exclusively, one that “only by an unjust twist of fate happens to temporarily run through Armenian territory.” A key paradox emerges in this arrangement: Armenia formally secures its rights on paper, but in practice is sidelined from actually managing the process. Is this not a veiled form of extraterritoriality, and a clear demonstration of the absence of full Armenian sovereignty over this stretch of land? When Azerbaijan controls both the entry point from its main territory and the exit point in Nakhchevan, it is Azerbaijan that dictates the terms of operation.

If one adds to this geographic dependency the provisions on so-called “front” and “back offices” set out in the Armenian-American documents published in January 2026, as well as the absence of clear guarantees that Armenian border and customs services alone will have full authority over security and control along the route, the picture becomes entirely transparent.

Having established full control over Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku is now obtaining from Yerevan, step by step, the very “Zangezur corridor” it originally demanded in its most maximalist form. Only the terminology has changed, not the substance.

Under these circumstances, the Constitutional Court’s ruling looks less like a demonstration of sovereign will and more like the technical and political formalization of the inevitable. Yerevan is counting on support from the US and international partners, yet, as Bayramov himself openly admits, it is the American side that regularly briefs Baku on the progress of Armenian-American negotiations. This means that the project’s parameters are, in any case, being shaped to fit Azerbaijan’s demands. As a result, the Armenian side risks ending up with an infrastructure asset that is legally within its own territory, but functions in practice according to rules set by, and in the interests of, Baku, leaving Azerbaijan free to block the route at any moment, simply by exercising its right to control its “entry and exit.”

Incidentally, what about the specific routes across Azerbaijani territory that would allow Armenia to connect with Iran and Russia? What do Bayramov or his Armenian counterpart, Ararat Mirzoyan, have to say about that? Indeed, nothing is said about it at all!

And could it turn out that, having handed over the corridor, Yerevan won’t even gain direct access to Russian and Iranian territory through Azerbaijan?

Think about it…