The “Zangezur corridor” or the open house? 

The active part of Armenian society today is deeply concerned over the Tavush problem. This is the problem of surrendering strategically important Armenian territories to Azerbaijan, as a result of which Armenia will not only lose part of the communications with Georgia, put the Armenia-Georgia gas pipeline at risk, and turn a number of settlements (such as Noyemberyan) into a dead end where it will be dangerous to live, but will also destroy the most prepared line of combat contact with Azerbaijan. Moreover, the scale of the expected concessions is so large that Nikol Pashinyan yesterday could not clearly tell the residents of Tavush exactly where the new border will be.

However, the problem is much bigger than it seems, with Azerbaijani and Turkish media publishing maps almost every day that reflect their real intentions.

From the published information and the comments of Azerbaijani and Turkish officials, it becomes clear that official Baku and Ankara plan to get not only one corridor through Syunik but also to turn the Syunik region and entire Armenia into an open house.

It is already obvious today that, having received territories in the Tavush region by May 15, Baku and Ankara will begin to exert even more pressure on official Yerevan, as they have become convinced that Nikol Pashinyan’s tactic is to “appease the aggressor” by fulfilling their demands.

But what do Baku and Ankara exactly want?

In addition to the road, they want to get a railway through Armenia, lay an oil pipeline, a gas pipeline, and other communications, and control them on the territory of Armenia. No matter how many times Pashinyan’s staff said that in exchange for providing communications, Armenia can receive gas from Azerbaijan, we can only state that Azerbaijan has no intentions or desires to satisfy any demands of the Armenian side.

Let’s think about what the reality would be after 2021 if the results of the early elections were different.

1. The talks around the Karabakh issue would not have failed, and the status quo that was formed after the war would have been preserved.
2. There would be no Prague, and Armenia would not recognize Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan.
3. Even if Azerbaijan had attacked Artsakh, the Armenian army would not have left Artsakh alone with the aggressor and would not have silently observed the ethnic cleansing in Artsakh from a distance.
4. Armenia’s territories near Jermuk would remain under the control of the Republic of Armenia.
5. The delimitation and demarcation of borders with Azerbaijan would have been legitimate in accordance with the maps of the Soviet period.
6. The delimitation would have taken place in such a way that the territories in Tavush would not have been surrendered to the enemy without commensurate concessions.
7. Relations with Russia would not be in crisis, and Iran would not see Armenia as a potential enemy.
Of course, history knows no “ifs”, but it is also obvious that if there are no political changes now, then what happened to Armenia after 2020 will seem like an “easy walk”. Armenia will eventually become like an open house, and the hammer that Pashinyan swung in 2021 will fall on the head of the Armenian statehood.

Think about it…