Handing over corridor to Azerbaijan while war is ongoing in Iran

In the Armenian information space, a narrative is being actively promoted about the “inevitability” and even the “nobility” of granting Azerbaijan a humanitarian corridor to Nakhichevan amid the Iranian crisis.

Propaganda, including on Public Television, calls to “help” the neighbor in difficult circumstances, deliberately ignoring the occupation of Armenian territories, the fate of prisoners, the recent ethnic cleansing in Artsakh, and Baku’s refusal to dismantle all structures linked to so‑called “Western Azerbaijan.”

This selective humanism looks especially surreal: Yerevan voluntarily assumes the role of rescuer for a side that not only continues aggression but also effectively disregards any gestures of goodwill coming from Armenia. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, acts with cold pragmatism, preferring direct agreements with Tehran over any initiatives from Yerevan. While Armenian experts discuss timetables for opening a “humanitarian corridor,” noting it could be done within days, Ilham Aliyev at this stage is stabilizing relations with Masoud Pezeshkian and official Tehran as a whole.

The outcome of their March negotiations was the delivery of 25 tons of Azerbaijani humanitarian aid to Iran—ranging from flour and rice to medicines—and the de facto opening of the border. In this situation, Yerevan’s attempts to impose its services look like a needless sacrifice that only undermines what remains of national sovereignty.

The danger of such an initiative lies not only in its political naivety but also in the strategic threat to one of Armenia’s two stable borders. By promoting the idea of “humanitarian transit” through Syunik, the Armenian side effectively legitimizes Azerbaijani claims previously presented as the demand for the so‑called “Zangezur corridor.” Moreover, if Baku manages to maintain transit to Nakhichevan through conflict‑ridden Iran, then any talk of the “humanitarian necessity” of a route through Armenia is nothing more than a cover for soft annexation.

Armenian authorities should have approached the conflict situation in Iran precisely from this perspective and advanced this argument. Instead, Yerevan risks ending up isolated: damaging relations with Tehran, receiving no gratitude from Baku, and ultimately turning its sovereign roads into a “gray zone” under foreign control.

P.S. Recall how swiftly Pashinyan ordered humanitarian aid to Turkey in February 2023 after the devastating earthquake. In the case of Iran, such promptness is absent. If Armenia truly aspired to become a “Crossroads of Peace” rather than part of the “Turkic World,” its attitude toward Iran would be the same as toward Turkey in 2023.

Think about it…