Beniamin Matevosyan: a new political crisis in Armenia

(First conclusions following the elections in Armenia)

The parliamentary elections held in Armenia demonstrated an unprecedented level of public mobilization, reflected in a surprisingly high voter turnout that surpassed previous electoral cycles. The country’s citizens were acutely aware of the defining nature of the vote in determining the state’s further geopolitical and domestic direction (turnout, according to the CEC of the Republic of Armenia, stood at 58.97%, or 1.477 million people). Nevertheless, hopes that these elections would become a point of consolidation for society and put an end to prolonged domestic political turbulence were not fully realized. On the contrary, the results recorded by the Central Election Commission lay the groundwork for a new and even deeper cycle of systemic crisis.

The main outcome of the electoral race was that the ruling Civil Contract party, led by incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, failed to secure an absolute majority of votes, falling just short of 50% (after processing ballots from all polling stations, Civil Contract received 49.81%). This is direct evidence of a serious divide in society and the absence of an unequivocal mandate of public trust for the current authorities to carry out radical reforms and changes. However, the specifics and nuances of Armenian electoral law and the constitutional system of mandate distribution allowed Pashinyan to circumvent this barrier and claim approximately 60% of seats in the National Assembly. This distribution guarantees the ruling force the ability to form a government on its own, but this victory is purely tactical and extremely vulnerable in nature.

The key problem for the incumbent prime minister is that he has lost the constitutional two-thirds majority required to pursue strategic objectives. The absence of 70 mandates in the new parliament creates insurmountable legal and procedural obstacles. Pashinyan is now legislatively blocked from amending the current Constitution, that had been one of his key political priorities. Without the consent of a firm and consolidated opposition represented by three major blocs, launching a referendum process or rewriting the country’s fundamental law will become legally impossible (there is also a scenario in which the opposition refuses its mandates or broadly contests the election results).

This legal deadlock directly undermines Yerevan’s international agenda, putting key foreign policy processes at risk. Without a constitutional majority, the executive branch is effectively stripped of the ability to ratify a full peace treaty with Baku, since any territorial or institutional changes required to formalize the new realities run up against the need to amend the legal framework.

A similar fate awaits other strategic agreements, including potential treaties on international transport corridors (TRIPP), as the opposition gains legitimate leverage to block them entirely within the walls of the National Assembly. Any attempt to push these decisions through in circumvention of established procedures will trigger a large-scale legal default within the country.

Against this backdrop, the crisis in relations between Yerevan and Moscow will inevitably continue to deepen. The election campaign clearly marked out an anti-Russian rhetorical vector on the part of the authorities, alongside formal overtures toward the European Union, a stance that provoked sharp disapproval in the Kremlin. A particularly notable and symbolic signal was Moscow’s conspicuous refusal to congratulate Pashinyan on his party’s electoral victory.

In other words, Armenia is steadily heading toward a new and far more destructive cycle of political crisis. The country finds itself in a situation of dangerous dual power: the executive branch holds enough mandates to retain its cabinet positions, but is stripped of the legal instruments needed to manage the state’s strategic future. Pashinyan’s attempts to continue his previous course without regard for the parliamentary minority will inevitably drive the confrontation out of the assembly halls and into the streets. Political deadlock, compounded by external pressure and internal division, makes large-scale systemic paralysis of Armenian statehood all but inevitable in the near term.

Think about that…