What exactly is the “third party” that Baku does not want to see on the border with Armenia?

What Nikol Pashinyan, who is on a visit to the United States, has managed to say over the past few days should be assessed in more detail in the future (and not only politically).

In an interview with the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, Ambassador John Herbst, Pashinyan touched upon the “peace agreement” with Azerbaijan, noting that one of the two points that were not agreed upon concerns the deployment of third-party forces along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. “Azerbaijan proposes to have a ban on the deployment of third-party forces along the border, meaning the European Civilian Monitoring Mission. We take note of this desire of Azerbaijan and have made our own proposal, which implies applying this point only to demarcated sections of the border,” he said.

First of all, let’s start with the fact that when they talk about “third parties” on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, they are talking not so much about European observers as about the potential reproduction of the Armenian-Turkish border configuration on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, where Russian border guards are on the front line, and Armenian troops are farther. The proof that observers from the EU do not pose a global problem for Aliyev is that he himself is personally involved in the fact that they appeared in the region.

Baku, which criticizes the work of the European Monitoring Mission in Armenia, should frankly admit that European observers appeared in Armenia thanks to the agreements reached at the meeting in Prague in October 2022. Then, following the negotiations, Armenia recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan surrendered Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan had to offer something in return. Yerevan assured that this would be Azerbaijan’s recognition of Armenia’s borders within the framework of the Alma Ata Declaration and consent to the EU observer mission.If you look back at how the “demarcation in Tavush” took place, you will see that it was preceded by the withdrawal of Russian border guards and not by an agreement that there would be no European observers in Kirants. Logic suggests that the initial agreement between the parties might be that Pashinyan ensures the withdrawal of Russian troops from all territories where they were deployed at the request of the Armenian side during the 44-day war and after it, and in exchange, Baku agrees to EU observers. If this reasonable doubt is true, then it turns out that Aliyev deceived Pashinyan, and after the withdrawal of Russian troops, he demands the withdrawal of observers. And the experience of previous processes shows that Baku will achieve its goal.

Moreover, Stratfor, with its new report, spoils an idyllic picture of Pashinyan, who at the same time proposed to “start everything from scratch in relations between Yerevan and Baku.” According to Stratfor, although Pashinyan’s statements emphasize that the signing of a “peace agreement” is theoretically close, issues related to the complete demarcation of the border are likely to prevent an agreement from being reached soon.

Ultimately, Karabakh was surrendered, Russian peacekeepers were withdrawn from Artsakh, and Russian border guards were withdrawn from a number of locations on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, while Russia itself gained a foothold in the South Caucasus thanks to an agreement with Iran, and Armenia did not receive recognition of territorial integrity, did not achieve the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the occupied territories, did not receive a “peace agreement,” and Yerevan is now being forced to reject European observers…

Think about it…