Beniamin Matevosyan: Tigranashen is the first victim of Pashinyan’s new program

(In which country was the Armenian government’s program written?)

The program presented by the Armenian government for 2026-2031 clearly demonstrates the consequences of the consistent dismantling of the traditional national security system. The document records not merely a formal geopolitical pivot by Yerevan away from Russia and the institutions of the CSTO and EAEU, but the actual surrender of the country’s strategic positions under the guise of institutionalizing peace. The foreign policy section of the program, filled with declarations of strategic partnership with the West and diplomatic normalization with Turkey, in practice looks like a plan for Armenia’s complete adaptation to Azerbaijan’s demands. The accelerating departure from the alliance with Moscow and the weakening of security guarantees, including the status of the 102nd military base, only push Baku and Ankara toward the final elimination of any potential threats posed by the Armenian state. Under these conditions, the key question is precisely whose interests such a document serves, and in which capital it was conceptualized.

The main practical embodiment of this logic is the readiness of the Armenian authorities to hand over the so-called enclaves to Azerbaijan’s control, among which Tigranashen occupies a special place. Statements by Nikol Pashinyan that “Karki” (Armenian Tigranashen), Barkhudarlu, and Yukhary Askipara are not part of Armenia’s 29,743-square-kilometer territory lay the theoretical groundwork for ceding territories of critical importance to the state’s survival. Attempts to reassure society with references to the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration and a formal exchange for the Artsvashen enclave ignore basic geographic and military reality. Artsvashen, separated from Armenia by 15 kilometers of Azerbaijani territory, would under current conditions become nothing more than an isolated military island, whose supply and development would carry colossal, high-risk costs.

The price Armenia will pay for surrendering Tigranashen and Voskepar proves fatal to its sovereignty. The most important interstate highway connecting the country’s central regions with Syunik and Iran runs through Tigranashen. Losing this junction would leave Yerevan with only a single, vulnerable route through Vedi, handing Baku an ideal staging ground for pressuring the capital and a constant threat of cutting off the Syunik region. A similar situation is developing in the northern direction: ceding territory in Tavush would place the main road to Georgia and the gas pipeline from Georgia running along the Red Bridge–Sevkar–Berd line directly within range of Azerbaijani artillery. Losing control over these junctions would place Armenia’s key transport and energy infrastructure under external control, creating a constant threat of total logistical and energy blockade. Pashinyan is helping Ilham Aliyev create the conditions for a blockade of Armenia, following the example of the Lachin corridor blockade.

The cabinet’s new program proposes replacing real levers of deterrence and defensive lines with the illusion of legal acts, diplomatic checkpoints, and vague security guarantees from outside players. Reducing the armed forces’ functions to operating exclusively within the borders, and relying on border guards while surrendering dominant heights, disarms the Armenian state in the face of a powerful neighbor. Stripping the country of key logistical arteries, accompanied by talk of diversification and peace, turns Armenia into an entity viable only within narrow borders, entirely dependent on the goodwill of Baku and Ankara.

In light of the above, a natural, legitimate question arises: how independent was Yerevan in drafting a document in which the surrender of key strategic heights is presented as a major peacemaking victory?

Think about it…