Beniamin Matevosyan: how will Putin react to von der Leyen’s visit to Armenia

(Is Pashinyan in the pocket of Eurocrats?)

The visit of Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, to Yerevan, and her promising statements at a joint briefing with Nikol Pashinyan, have finally cemented Armenia’s geopolitical drift toward the West. The Armenian prime minister’s highlighted “refusal” of any chance of repeating the 2013 scenario, when Serzh Sargsyan, then president, reversed course overnight from EU association toward the Customs Union, amounted to an open challenge to Moscow. Brussels duly took note, immediately offering financial and expert “safety cushions” in case Russia decides to use economic levers of pressure, in particular by raising natural gas prices.

But behind the elegant language about diversifying energy supplies, investing 25 million euros in South Caucasus energy security, and developing renewable energy lies a far harsher political reality. Many experts have formed a firm impression that Brussels sees Armenia as a new Ukraine, applying to the region scenarios already tested in Kyiv and Chisinau. And this is not just about sending European experts to reform the energy sector. The main parallel lies in how European officials are “pumping up” Pashinyan ahead of the inevitable continuation of extremely difficult negotiations with Russia.

The European Union is, in effect, sending Yerevan a signal identical to the one broadcast to Ukraine’s leadership for years: when you sit down at the negotiating table with Vladimir Putin, know that the full weight of the EU stands behind you. The West is deliberately trying to artificially strengthen Pashinyan’s negotiating position, pushing him toward tougher, more uncompromising rhetoric in dialogue with Moscow. This strategy is designed to instill in Armenia’s leadership a false sense of complete security and confidence that Europe will offset any cost of severing traditional allied ties with Russia.

This raises a legitimate question about the sincerity of Brussels’ own intentions. Why didn’t the EU provide Armenia with real access to its markets before Yerevan’s relations with Russia ran into serious trouble? Why were European institutions in no hurry to help the republic diversify its economy and energy sector during the years when Armenia maintained a constructive and stable dialogue with Moscow? The fact that large-scale economic assistance, promises to open the market to 80% of Armenian exports, and talk of energy independence only began after the radical deterioration of Russian-Armenian relations speaks for itself. There is a persistent sense that Brussels is prepared to pay not for the real development of Armenia’s economy and the well-being of its citizens, but exclusively for the current Armenian government’s anti-Russian course.

The reaction of Vladimir Putin and official Moscow to this visit, and to Pashinyan’s openly anti-Russian statements, is unlikely to be limited to verbal diplomatic notes. Moscow has already begun deploying tools of soft economic pressure, including phytosanitary bans on Armenian produce and tightened controls at the Verkhny Lars checkpoint. Should the escalation continue and Yerevan definitively move under the patronage of the Eurocrats, the Kremlin may revise its tariff policy on gas and other critically important resources supplied to the republic. Putin’s response will evidently be pragmatic and systemic, demonstrating to Yerevan that the EU’s 25 million euros are a drop in the ocean compared to the real economic preferences Armenia risks losing for good within the Eurasian Economic Union.

Think about it…