Beniamin Matevosyan: Is Pashinyan illegitimate in Russia’s eyes?

(Moscow’s position toward Armenia’s authorities has not changed)

The interim result of the electoral cycle, through which society is being convinced that Nikol Pashinyan’s rule has been extended for another five years, and that he “did not run for a third term, since the previous two elections were snap elections,” has not brought Yerevan the long-awaited stabilization on the foreign policy track. Despite the upbeat statements of Armenia’s top-tier officials (from Alen Simonyan and Gevorg Papyan to Nikol Pashinyan), who are trying to persuade local audiences of the unchanged and solid nature of trade and economic ties with the key ally, Moscow is displaying an unprecedented hardening of rhetoric.

Pashinyan, Papyan, and Simonyan’s assurances that pragmatism will prevail are shattered by harsh reality: Russia has not shifted its principled stance toward Armenia’s current leadership and its strategic course by even a millimeter. It is evident that the credit of trust has been entirely exhausted, and the Kremlin no longer intends to separate economic preferences from political loyalty, shifting the bilateral relationship to the language of hard ultimatums.

The main signal of this tectonic shift was the official statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declaring that Moscow can no longer tolerate what it openly describes as the “dependent stance” of Armenia’s authorities toward the Eurasian Economic Union. Yerevan’s attempt to sit on two chairs, extracting enormous benefits from the duty-free Eurasian market while simultaneously accelerating the legislative framework for integration into the European Union, met with categorical pushback from Russian diplomats. The intention to enjoy the benefits of the EAEU while simultaneously preparing for membership in a bloc hostile to Russia has been deemed incompatible. Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, directly stressed that the issue is now acute, as EAEU and EU norms are mutually exclusive. For Armenia’s economy, critically dependent on the Russian market, this means a swift and inevitable end to the era of windfall revenues from re-export, parallel imports, and unhindered sales of local goods. Once Moscow begins to actively “sort out” Armenia’s membership in the economic union, the country will find itself on the brink of a profound economic crisis that Yerevan’s Western partners will be neither able nor willing to offset.

The rapid cooling is also evident at the highest diplomatic level, where Moscow is conspicuously distancing itself from recognizing the legitimacy of the recent elections. The Kremlin’s comments regarding a possible meeting between Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan are maximally guarded and noncommittal: no concrete arrangements have been made, and the Russian side has chosen to adopt a wait-and-see posture pending the official announcement of results and the review of the inevitable appeals from the opposition. At the same time, Moscow’s rhetoric toward Yerevan’s Western handlers has become extremely sharp. Russia’s foreign policy ministry directly accused the European Union of hands-on management of electoral processes in Armenia, where, in the interest of the outcome desired by Brussels, all proclaimed principles of democracy and non-interference were trampled. The false dilemma of a choice between Russia and the EU, imposed on Armenian society, served the sole purpose of splitting the country from within and turning it into a tool of anti-Russian policy.

In parallel, the main myth of Armenia’s government propaganda is also crumbling, the claim that the tough signals from Moscow allegedly consolidated the electorate around Pashinyan in the face of an external threat. As statements by representatives of the opposition party Strong Armenia have plainly demonstrated, the real picture of the elections is far from the consensus being broadcast by the authorities. The success of Civil Contract was the result of large-scale administrative manipulation, pressure, and persecution of opposition figures, none of which has any connection to Western sanctions or Russian pressure. The incumbent authorities never counted on a fair, competitive contest; instead, they relied on blatant vote padding and the complicity of European observers who turned a blind eye to violations. The Moscow factor, therefore, was not the foundation of Pashinyan’s pre-election strategy, it was merely used as a smokescreen. The bottom line is that Armenia is left with a government illegitimate in the eyes of its principal economic benefactor, a rapidly closing Russian market, and illusory European prospects that, in the coming months, will translate into severe economic consequences for ordinary citizens.

Think about that…