Armenian authorities will not draw conclusions from attacks on Iran

On the evening of Friday, June 13, Iran struck Israeli territory, launching hundreds of missiles and drones. This was in response to Israel’s Rising Lion operation, in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacked Iranian nuclear facilities and eliminated a significant portion of the country’s military leadership—about 20 high-ranking generals. Now, Iran is talking about the beginning of a full-scale war, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is openly calling on Iranians to overthrow the Islamic Republic’s regime.

For many, including those in Iran, Israel’s attack was apparently unexpected—especially given the ongoing negotiations with the United States on the “Iranian nuclear dossier.” But is the problem only in the negotiations? Is it merely a result of Iranian intelligence and counterintelligence losing vigilance for several months? The problem runs much deeper than the last eight or nine months of “Iranian intelligence inattention.” Tehran allowed itself to be struck at a time when it was methodically being deprived of strategic depth: Bashar al-Assad’s government fell, Hamas’ military wing was destroyed, and most importantly—Hezbollah was effectively left to be torn apart by Israel and the US.

Tehran absurdly surrendered its most valuable asset—Hezbollah—for the chance of securing a deal with the West. This deal became an obsession, for which the Iranian leadership was willing to sacrifice everything, including relations with Russia, Syria, or Hezbollah. Yet Hezbollah was a crucial strategic tool in Iran’s deterrence arsenal. Despite being weakened, it still controls southern Lebanon, from where Iranian drones could have caused Israel significant problems. But no intervention followed—perhaps because Tehran ultimately decided to trade Hezbollah for Western guarantees on the “nuclear dossier.”

Overall, the nuclear deal with the West seems to have become for some in the Iranian elite what normalizing relations with Turkey became for certain Armenian politicians. Armenia relinquished Artsakh just as Iran abandoned Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah—in exchange for promises.

Just as the surrender of Artsakh was not a single-step maneuver but a complex chain of consequences—potentially even leading to the destruction of Armenian statehood—the abandonment of Iran’s nuclear program is not merely a concession but a gradual erosion of the country’s strategic depth. In Armenia, romanticizing Turkey has led to similar consequences as romanticizing the West in Iran.

In such processes, the question always arises: cui prodest—who benefits? A major war between Iran and Israel does not benefit the United States, as it delays Washington’s exit from the region, diverting resources that could otherwise be focused on containing China. Unsurprisingly, CNN has already reported that Donald Trump is skeptical about US involvement in this conflict. This, in turn, means that a prolonged war involving the US benefits China and possibly its allies—such as the United Kingdom—since it indefinitely postpones Washington’s strategic concentration against Beijing.

The war also benefits Russia: it disperses US financial and military aid to Ukraine, and Ukraine has practically disappeared from the media agenda in recent days. This gives Moscow a chance for a summer offensive amid global silence, preoccupied with Middle Eastern events.

Armenia should undoubtedly learn from Iran’s experience: Iran’s political elite relied on Western guarantees and miscalculated. But Armenia will not draw these conclusions. Over the years in power, Nikol Pashinyan has brought the country’s sovereignty to such a vulnerable state that any further steps may exacerbate the situation. It is not excluded that rumors about his upcoming visit to Turkey will be confirmed—where he may pledge to open the Zangezur corridor, explaining it at home as “a changed geopolitical situation.” After all, Artsakh was surrendered—taking advantage of Russia’s failures on the Ukrainian front.

Think about it…