Exacerbation of Russian-Azerbaijani relations could be a chance for Armenia

The Russian-Azerbaijani relations are increasingly beginning to resemble the realities of the Armenian-Russian relations of recent years; not a week goes by without a “diplomatic shootout” between the parties.

Formally, it all started with the fact that on December 25, 2024, Azerbaijan Airlines’ (AZAL) Embraer 190 passenger plane operating a Baku-Grozny flight crashed near Aktau Airport in Kazakhstan. Russia’s civil aviation authority Rosaviatsia explained that the plane’s landing in Grozny failed due to fog and the “Carpet” plan, which had been imposed as a result of “Ukraine’s terrorist attacks.” On December 28, President Vladimir Putin, in a conversation with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev, noted that at the time of the landing of the AZAL aircraft, Grozny was attacked by Ukrainian drones and “Russian air defense systems repelled these attacks.”

Aliyev said the next day that the aircraft was “rendered uncontrollable by electronic warfare”, its tail “was severely hit by fire from the ground.” He also said that Russia should take responsibility and publicly apologize for the situation with the plane, punish those responsible, and pay compensation to Azerbaijan.

Already in January, Russian sources published a transcript of the negotiations between the crew of the aircraft and the dispatchers. It said that the crew tried to land in Grozny several times, then informed dispatchers about the “bird strike” and damage to the cockpit. The publication of the talks put official Baku in an awkward position, as it completely destroyed the Azerbaijani version of what happened. And after that, Azerbaijani television prepared a report against the “Russian House” in Baku, accusing it of espionage activities. This is what the leaders of the “Russian House” reacted to, promising to sue the Azerbaijani Baku TV channel.

Later it became known that the Azerbaijani ambassador to Russia was summoned to the Foreign Ministry, where Russian diplomats expressed bewilderment at the “series of anti-Russian reports in the local press.” Baku found nothing better than to summon the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan to the Foreign Ministry in response.
Even Russian sources, who have long held positions as loyal to Baku as possible, openly say that the Azerbaijani leader has crossed a number of “red lines”, which cannot remain unanswered. In fact, the situation with the plane is just an excuse to “open a festering wound” in Russian-Azerbaijani relations.

There have always been reports against Russia in the Azerbaijani state media. It is easy to verify this by reading the Azerbaijani reports for the summer of 2023. At that time, Azerbaijan was expecting a Ukrainian counteroffensive more than Ukraine itself. And Aliyev, who colluded with the United States, France, and the EU in October 2022 in Prague, did this not only to gain control of Artsakh but also to push Russians out of the region, which also could not remain without consequences.

All other things being equal, if relations between Yerevan and Moscow had not been damaged by the hands of the Armenian authorities, the current crisis in relations between Baku and Moscow could have been a good reason to promote the interests of Armenia and Artsakh.

Of course, no one is saying that Shushi would have become Armenian again in these days of 2025, but it was possible, at least, to insist on revising the provisions of the November 9, 2020 agreement to extend the Russian mission in Artsakh. Or to get Azerbaijan to approve such demarcation maps that would be more in line with the interests of Armenia than what Aliyev and Pashinyan are imposing on the Armenian people today under the guise of “establishing borders.”
And here this question becomes relevant again: what’s the cost of Pashinyan’s mistakes for the Armenian people? Or maybe these are not mistakes, but something else?

Think about it…