The “Other Side” of Pashinyan’s Foreign Policy

Perhaps if more people had been familiar with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s articles from the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as the contents of his book “The Other Side of the Earth,” the events of 2018 could have unfolded differently. Pashinyan’s marginal views would likely have struggled to gain the support of the citizens of the Republic of Armenia. While citizens could afford to overlook his “works,” the political elite of Armenia—some of whom, by their own admission, financed Pashinyan’s newspaper—could not have been unaware of whom they were dealing with. However, today we are forced to live in the reality of Pashinyan’s “The Other Side of the Earth” and analyze the “other side of the foreign policy” of the leader of the Civil Contract party.

On one hand, he is visiting the memorial to the victims of communism in Tallinn; on the other, he travels to Moscow on May 9 to attend the parade marking the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. This situation is so paradoxical that even Estonian journalists express surprise.

The experience of previous years shows that Pashinyan’s “geopolitical splits” will not end here. For example, in 2021, before the snap elections to the National Assembly, the Armenian side proposed to Russia’s top leadership to open four new Russian schools in Armenia. However, after the elections, the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports of Armenia “unexpectedly” declared that such schools contradict the Armenian legislation. It is possible that this time Pashinyan will try to propose to Russia the idea of creating, for example, a center for gifted children.
In addition, the June visit of Federation Council Chair Valentina Matvienko to Armenia, along with a potential visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, are part of Pashinyan’s preparations for the 2026 elections. These visits should demonstrate to the Russian political elites that the current Armenian leadership supposedly values relations with Russia and understands its importance to the Armenian people.

However, the facts speak for themselves. Even leaving aside all the “anti-Russian baggage” accumulated since 2021, the recent “EU Accession Law” clearly shows where Yerevan will “head” after the 2026 elections if Pashinyan remains in power.

Given that the “West” in the region is represented by Turkey, Armenia’s integration into the Turkic world may accelerate after 2026. This would create a unique situation: the Armenian government, relying on Russian resources and economic cooperation with Russia, would seek Moscow’s support to facilitate Russia’s withdrawal from the region and transfer Armenia under the influence of Moscow’s strategic adversary, Turkey. This is the “other side of Pashinyan’s foreign policy.”

Think about it.…