Erdogan’s services have their price

It is often easier to let a moth into a wardrobe with clothes than to get rid of it later. It is exactly the same with Turkey—once letting it into a particular process, it can be difficult to get it out of there. Look at how Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still trying to “revive the Istanbul process” or the “grain deal.” Therefore, when before 2018, Armenia made statements that “Turkey can assist in the Karabakh settlement process,” and after the 2020 war and ethnic cleansing in Artsakh in the fall of 2023, Turkey was directly asked to mediate in the Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization, you need to realize that getting this country out of this process will be very difficult—for any authority.

Now the Turkish president is engaged in legalizing his status as a “mediator” in the Armenian-Azerbaijani process. This was precisely what Erdogan’s recent statement was about. He noted that he hoped that outside forces would not be able to sabotage the Armenian-Azerbaijani process. In other words, Erdogan demonstrates to the players involved in regional development that he will not tolerate interference in matters that Ankara considers its prerogative.

Once again, it is paradoxical that one of the countries that signed the “Shushi Declaration”, which reflects the claims to Armenian sovereignty, can be a mediator in the talks between Yerevan and Baku. However, an even greater paradox lies in the fact that Recep Tayyip Erdogan may demand (and most likely has already demanded) payment for his “mediation services.”

There is an opinion in the Armenian political community that the Turkish leader may demand that Yerevan completely abandon the topic of international recognition of the Armenian Genocide, may join Baku’s demands to change the Constitution of Armenia, and also demand the closure of the Metsamor nuclear power plant.

Of course, all this is possible. However, Erdogan is a practical man with strategic thinking. Therefore, it would be logical if, as a payment for his “mediation services” (which will not necessarily lead to the “normalization of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations”), he demands the withdrawal of Russian border guards from the Margara checkpoint, and the next step is the complete withdrawal of Russian border guards from the Armenian-Turkish border.

There is only one question left to answer. And this is not at all a question of whether Armenia itself will be able to ensure security on the border section with a length of more than 300 km. The question is, has Nikol Pashinyan already managed to demand the withdrawal of Russian border guards from Margara and from the Armenian-Turkish border in general, or is he preparing a “gift” to Armenia and the Armenian people for 2025?

Think about it…